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Abstract
We study the House Allocation problem (also known as the Assignment problem),
i.e., the problem of allocating a set of objects among a set of agents, where each agent
has ordinal preferences (possibly involving ties) over a subset of the objects. We focus
on truthful mechanisms without monetary transfers for finding large Pareto optimal
matchings. It is straightforward to show that no deterministic truthful mechanism can
approximate a maximum cardinality Pareto optimal matching with ratio better than
2. We thus consider randomised mechanisms. We give a natural and explicit extension
of the classical Random Serial Dictatorship Mechanism (RSDM) specifically for the
House Allocation problem where preference lists can include ties. We thus obtain
a universally truthful randomised mechanism for finding a Pareto optimal matching
and show that it achieves an approximation ratio of ee−1 . The same bound holds
even when agents have priorities (weights) and our goal is to find a maximum weight
(as opposed to maximum cardinality) Pareto optimal matching. On the other hand
we give a lower bound of 1813 on the approximation ratio of any universally truthful
Pareto optimal mechanism in settings with strict preferences. In the case that the
mechanism must additionally be non-bossy with an additional technical assumption,
we show by utilizing a result of Bade that an improved lower bound of ee−1 holds. This
lower bound is tight since RSDM for strict preference lists is non-bossy. We moreover
interpret our problem in terms of the classical secretary problem and prove that our
mechanism provides the best randomised strategy of the administrator who interviews
the applicants.
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1 Introduction
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible objects among a set of agents. Each
agent has private ordinal preferences over a subset of objects — those they find acceptable,
and each agent may be allocated at most one object. This problem has been studied by
both economists and computer scientists. When monetary transfers are not permitted,
the problem is referred to as the House Allocation problem (henceforth abbreviated by
HA [20, 1, 38] or the Assignment problem [19, 9] in the literature. In this paper we opt
for the term House Allocation problem. Most of the work in the literature assumes that
the agents have strict preferences over their acceptable objects. However, it often happens
though that an agent is indifferent between two or more objects. Here we let agents express
indifference, and hence preferences may involve ties unless explicitly stated otherwise.
It is often desired that as many objects as possible become allocated among the agents
— i.e., an allocation of maximum size is picked, hence making as many agents happy as
possible. Usually, depending on the application of the problem, we are required to con-
sider some other optimality criteria, sometimes instead of, and sometimes in addition to,
maximising the size of the allocation. Several optimality criteria have been considered in
the HA setting, and perhaps the most studied such concept is Pareto optimality (see, e.g.,
[1, 2, 15, 12, 33]), sometimes referred to as Pareto efficiency. Economists, in particular,
regard Pareto optimality as the most fundamental requirement for any “reasonable” so-
lution to a non-cooperative game. Roughly speaking, an allocation µ is Pareto optimal
if there does not exist another allocation µ′ in which no agent is worse off, and at least
one agent is better off, in µ′. In this work we are mainly concerned with Pareto optimal
allocations of maximum size, but will also consider weighted generalisations.
The related Housing Market problem (HM) [29, 30, 34] is the variant of HA in which
there is an initial endowment, i.e., each agent owns a unique object initially (in this
case the numbers of agents and objects are usually defined to be equal). In this setting,
the most widely studied solution concept is that of the core, which is an allocation of
agents to objects satisfying the property that no coalition C of agents can improve (i.e.,
every agent in C is better off) by exchanging their own resources (i.e., the objects they
brought to the market). In the case of strict preferences, the core is always non-empty [30],
unique, and indeed Pareto optimal. When preferences may include ties, the notion of core
that we defined is sometimes referred to as the weak core. In this case a core allocation
need not be Pareto optimal. Jaramillo and Manjunath [21], Plaxton [27], and Saban and
Sethuraman [32] provide polynomial-time algorithms for finding a core allocation that
does additionally satisfy Pareto optimality. Our problem differs from HM in that there
is no initial endowment, and hence our focus is on Pareto optimal matchings rather than
outcomes in the core.
For strictly-ordered preference lists, Abraham et al. [2] gave a characterisation of Pareto
optimal matchings that led to an O(m) algorithm for checking an arbitrary matching for
Pareto optimality, where m is the total length of the agents’ preference lists. This char-
acterisation was extended to the case that preference lists may include ties by Manlove
[24, Sec. 6.2.2.1], also leading to an O(m) algorithm for checking a matching for Pareto
optimality. For strictly-ordered lists, a maximum cardinality Pareto optimal matching can
be found in O(
√
n1m) time, where n1 is the number of agents [2]. The fastest algorithm
currently known for this problem when preference lists may include ties is based on min-
imum cost maximum cardinality matching and has complexity O(
√
nm log n) (see, e.g.,
[24, Sec. 6.2.2.1], where n is the total number of agents and objects.
As stated earlier, agents’ preferences are private knowledge. Hence, unless they find it
in their own best interests, agents may not reveal their preferences truthfully. An alloca-
tion mechanism is truthful if it gives agents no incentive to misrepresent their preferences.
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, a mechanism based on constructing a maximum cardinality Pareto
optimal allocation is manipulable by agents misrepresenting their preferences (Theorem 2.3
in Section 2). Hence, we need to make a compromise and weaken at least one of these
requirements. In this work, we relax our quest for finding a maximum cardinality Pareto
optimal allocation by trading off the size of a Pareto optimal allocation against truth-
fulness; more specifically, we seek truthful Pareto optimal mechanisms that provide good
approximations to the maximum size.
Under strict preferences, Pareto optimal matchings can be computed by a classical
algorithm called the Serial Dictatorship Mechanism (SDM) (see, e.g., [1]), also referred
to as the Priority Mechanism (see, e.g., [9]). SDM is a straightforward greedy algorithm
that takes each agent in turn and allocates to him the most preferred available object on
his preference list. Precisely due to this greedy approach, SDM is truthful. Furthermore,
SDM is guaranteed to find a Pareto optimal allocation that has size at least half that of
a maximum one, merely because any Pareto optimal allocation has size at least half that
of a maximum one (see, e.g., [2]). Hence, at least in the case of strict preferences, we are
guaranteed an approximation ratio of 2. Can we do better? It turns out that if we stay
in the realm of deterministic mechanisms, a 2-approximation is the best we can hope for
(Theorem 2.3, Section 2).
Hence we turn to randomised mechanisms in order to achieve a better approximation
ratio. The obvious candidate to consider is the Random Serial Dictatorship Mechanism
(RSDM) (see, e.g., [1]), also known as the Random Priority mechanism (see, e.g., [9]),
that is defined for HA instances with strict preferences. RSDM randomly generates an
ordering of the agents and then proceeds by running SDM relative to this ordering.
When indifference is allowed, finding a Pareto optimal allocation is not as straightfor-
ward as for strict preferences. For example, one may consider breaking the ties randomly
and then applying SDM. This approach, unfortunately, may produce an allocation that
is not Pareto optimal. To see this, consider a setting with two agents, 1 and 2, and two
objects, o1 and o2. Assume that 1 finds both objects acceptable and is indifferent between
them, and that 2 finds only o1 acceptable. The only Pareto optimal matching for this
setting is the one in which 1 and 2 are assigned o2 and o1 respectively. Assume that 1 is
served first and that, as both objects are equally acceptable to him, is assigned o1 (after
an arbitrary tie-breaking). Therefore when 2’s turn arrives, there is no object remaining
that he finds acceptable, and is hence left unmatched, resulting in a matching that is not
Pareto optimal.
Few works in the literature have considered extensions of SDM to the case where agents’
preferences may include ties. However Bogomolnaia and Moulin [10] and Svensson [35]
provide an implicit extension of SDM (in the former case for dichotomous preferences1)
but do not give an explicit description of an algorithm. Aziz et al. [4] provide an explicit
extension for a more general class of problems, including HA. Pareto optimal matchings in
HA can also be found by reducing to the HM setting [21], which involves creating dummy
objects as endowments for the agents. This allows one of the aforementioned algorithms
for HM [21, 27, 32] to be utilised to find a Pareto optimal matching in the core. However
the reduction increases the instance size, and in particular the number of agents n1 and
the maximum length of a tie in any agent’s preference list. Consequently, even the fastest
truthful Pareto optimal mechanism for HM, that of Saban and Sethuraman [32], has time
complexity no better than O(n31) in the worst case.
Contributions of this paper. In this paper we provide a natural and explicit extension
of SDM for the setting in which preferences may exhibit indifference. We argue that our
1An agent’s preference list is dichotomous if it comprises a single tie containing all acceptable objects.
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extension is more intuitive than that of Aziz et al. [4] when considering specifically HA.
Moreover, as the mechanism of Saban and Sethuraman [32] does not consider the agents
sequentially, it is difficult to analyse its approximation guarantee. Our algorithm runs in
time O(n21γ+m), where γ is the maximum length of a tie in any agent’s preference list
and m is the total length of the agents’ preference lists. This is faster than the algorithm
in [32] when γ = o(n1) and m = o(n
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1). We prove the following results that involve
upper and lower bounds for the approximation ratio (relative to the size of a maximum
cardinality Pareto optimal matching) of randomised truthful mechanisms for computing
a Pareto optimal matching:
1. By extending RSDM to the case of preference lists with ties, we give a universally
truthful randomised mechanism2 for finding a Pareto optimal matching that has an
approximation ratio of ee−1 with respect to the size of a maximum cardinality Pareto
optimal matching.
2. We give a lower bound of 1813 on the approximation ratio of any universally truthful
Pareto optimal mechanism in settings with strict preferences. If the mechanism must
additionally be non-bossy, with an additional technical assumption3, we observe that
[7] implies an improved lower bound of ee−1 . This lower bound is tight since the
classical RSDM mechanism for strict preferences is non-bossy.
3. We extend RSDM to the setting where agents have priorities (weights) and our
goal is to find a maximum weight (as opposed to maximum cardinality) Pareto
optimal matching. Our mechanism is universally truthful and guarantees a ee−1 -
approximation with respect to the weight of a maximum weight Pareto optimal
matching.
4. We finally observe that our problem has an “online” or sequential flavour similar to
secretary problems4. Given this interpretation, we prove that our mechanism uses
the best random strategy of interviewing the applicants in the sense that any other
strategy would lead to an approximation ratio worse than ee−1 (see also below under
related work).
Discussion of technical contributions. As observed above via a simple example,
SDM with arbitrary tie breaking need not lead to a Pareto optimal matching in general.
Indeed, the presence of indifference in agents’ preference lists introduces major technical
difficulties. This is because decisions with respect to objects in one tie cannot be committed
to when an agent is considered, as they may block some choices for future agents. When
extending SDM from strict preferences to preferences with ties, we first present an intuitive
mechanism, called SDMT-1, based on the idea of augmenting paths. It is relatively easy
to prove that SDMT-1 is Pareto optimal and truthful. We also show that SDMT-1 is
2A randomised mechanism is universally truthful if it is a probability distribution over truthful deter-
ministic mechanisms. This is the strongest known notion of truthfulness for randomised mechanisms.
3A deterministic mechanism in settings with strict preferences is non-bossy if no agent can misreport
his preferences in such a way that his allocation is not changed but the allocation of some other agent is
changed. This additional assumption restricts the class to randomised mechanisms that are symmetriza-
tions of truthful, Pareto optimal and non-bossy mechanisms, see Section 6 for details.
4In the secretary problem, an administrator is willing to hire the best secretary out of n rankable
applicants for a position. The applicants are interviewed one-by-one in random order. A decision about
each particular applicant is to be made immediately after the interview. Once rejected, an applicant
cannot be recalled. During the interview, the administrator can rank the applicant among all applicants
interviewed so far, but is unaware of the quality of yet unseen applicants. The question is about the
optimal strategy to maximise the probability of selecting the best applicant.
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able to generate any given Pareto optimal matching. However, it is difficult to analyse
the approximation guarantee of the randomised version of SDMT-1. For this purpose we
build on the primal-dual analysis of Devanur et al. [16]. They employ a linear programming
(LP) relaxation of the bipartite weighted matching problem. They prove that their dual
solution is feasible in expectation for the dual LP and use it to show the approximation
guarantee. Towards this goal they prove two technical lemmas, a dominance lemma and
a monotonicity lemma. The randomised version of SDMT-1 uses random variables Yi for
each agent i ∈ N to generate a random order in which agents are considered. Considering
agent i and fixed values of the random variables Y−i of all other agents, Devanur et al. [16]
define a threshold yc, which as Yi varies determines when agent i is matched (to an object)
or unmatched (dominance lemma). (Note that we will denote the threshold yc as θ.) The
monotonicity lemma shows how values of the dual LP variables change when Yi varies. To
extend the definition of yc, we need to remember the structure of all potential augmenting
paths in SDMT-1, and for this purpose we introduce a second mechanism, SDMT-2.
Interestingly, SDMT-2 is inspired by the idea of top trading cycle mechanisms, see, e.g.,
[32], however it retains the “sequential” nature of SDMT-1. The two mechanisms, SDMT-
1 and SDMT-2, are equivalent: they match the same agents, giving them objects from
the same ties. This implies that SDMT-2 is also truthful and Pareto optimal. SDMT-2 is
the key to defining the threshold yc: its running time is no worse than that of SDMT-1,
but it implicitly maintains all relevant augmenting paths arising from agents’ ties. We
prove the monotonicity and dominance lemmas for SDMT-2 by carefully analysing the
structure of frozen subgraphs that are generated from the relevant augmenting paths;
here frozen roughly means that they will not change subsequently. Finally, we would
like to highlight that our proof of an 1813 lower bound on the approximation ratio of any
universally truthful and Pareto optimal mechanism uses Yao’s minmax principle and an
interesting case analysis to account for all such possible mechanisms.
Related work. This work can be placed in the context of designing truthful approx-
imate mechanisms for problems in the absence of monetary transfer [28]. Bogomolnaia
and Moulin [9] designed a randomised weakly truthful and envy-free mechanism, called
the Probabilistic Serial mechanism (PS), for HA with complete lists. Very recently the
same authors considered the same approximation problem as ours but in the context of
envy-free rather than truthful mechanisms, and for strict preference lists and unweighted
agents [11]. They showed that PS has an approximation ratio of ee−1 , which is tight for any
envy-free mechanism. Bhalgat et al. [8] investigated the social welfare of PS and RSDM.
Tight deterministic truthful mechanisms for weighted matching markets were proposed by
Dughmi and Ghosh [18] and they also presented an O(log n)-approximate random truthful
mechanism for the Generalised Assignment Problem (GAP) by reducing, with logarith-
mic loss in the approximation, to the solution for the value-invariant GAP. In subsequent
work Che et al. [14] provided an O(1)-approximation mechanism for GAP. Aziz et al. [5]
studied notions of fairness involving the stochastic dominance relation in the context of
HA, and presented various complexity results for problems involving checking whether a
fair assignment exists. Chakrabarty and Swamy [13] proposed rank approximation as a
measure of the quality of an outcome and introduced the concept of lex-truthfulness as a
notion of truthfulness for randomised mechanisms in HA.
RSDM is related to online bipartite matching algorithms. The connection was ob-
served by Bhalgat et al. [8], who noted the similarity between RSDM and the RANKING
algorithm of Karp et al. [22]. Karp et al. [22] proved that the expected size of the matching
given by their RANKING algorithm is at least e−1e times the optimal size. Bhalgat et al.
[8] observed that RSDM will essentially behave the same way as RANKING for instances
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of HA where the agents’ preference lists relate to the order in which the objects arrive.
Hence for this family of instances an approximation ratio of ee−1 holds for RSDM.
The weighted version of our problem is related to two widely-studied online settings,
known in the literature as the online vertex-weighted bipartite matching problem [3] and
secretary problems [6]. In our problem the administrator holds all the objects (they can
be thought of as available positions), and all agents with unknown preference lists are
applicants for these objects. Each applicant also has a private weight, which can be
thought of as their quality (reflecting the fact that some of an agent’s skills may not be
evident from their CV, for example). However we assume that they cannot overstate
their weights (skills), because they might be checked and punished. This is similar to the
classical assumption of no overbidding (e.g., in sponsored search auctions). Applicants
are interviewed one-by-one in a random order. When an applicant arrives he chooses his
most-preferred available object and the decision as to whether it is allocated to him is
made immediately, and cannot be changed in the future.
Our weighted agents correspond to weighted vertices in the vertex-weighted bipartite
matching context, but our objects do not arrive online as in the setting of [3]. However, if
the preference ordering of each agent in our setting, over his acceptable objects, coincides
with the arrival order of the objects in [3], then the two problems are the same. In
the transversal matroid secretary problem, see, e.g., [17], objects are known in advance
as in our setting, weighted agents arrive in a (uniform) random order, and the goal is
to match them to previously unmatched objects. The administrator’s goal is to find a
(random) arrival order of agents that maximises the ratio between the total weight of
matched agents and the maximum weight of a matching if all the agents preference lists
are known in advance. We show that even if the weights of all agents are the same, our
algorithm uses the best possible random strategy; no other such strategy leads to better
than ee−1 -approximate matching.
Organisation of the paper. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In
Section 2 we define notation and terminology used in this paper, and show the straight-
forward lower bound for the approximation ratio of deterministic truthful mechanisms.
SDMT-1 and SDMT-2 are presented in Sections 3 and 4 respectively, and in the latter
section it is proved that the two mechanisms are essentially equivalent. The approximation
ratio of ee−1 for the randomised version of the two mechanisms is established in Section 5,
whilst Section 6 contains our lower bound results. Finally, some concluding remarks are
given in Section 7.
2 Definitions and preliminary observations
Let N = {1, 2, · · · , n1} be a set of n1 agents and O = {o1, o2, . . . , on2} be a set of n2
objects. Let n = n1 + n2. Let [i] denote the set {1, 2, · · · , i}. We assume that each agent
i ∈ N finds a subset of objects acceptable and has a preference ordering, not necessarily
strict, over these objects. We write ot i os to denote that agent i strictly prefers object
ot to object os, and write ot 'i os to denote that i is indifferent between ot and os. We
use ot i os to denote that agent i either strictly prefers ot to os or is indifferent between
them, and say that i weakly prefers ot to os. In some cases a weight wi is associated with
each agent i, representing the priority or importance of the agent. Weights need not be
distinct. Let W = (w1, w2, . . . , wn1). To simplify definitions, we assume that all agents
are assigned weight equal to 1 if we are in an unweighted setting.
We assume that the indifference relation is transitive. This implies that each agent
essentially divides his acceptable objects into different bins or indifference classes such
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that he is indifferent between the objects in the same indifference class and has a strict
preference ordering over these indifference classes. For each agent i, let Cik, 1 ≤ k ≤ n2,
denote the kth indifference class, or tie, of agent i. We also assume that if there exists
l ∈ [n2], where Cil = ∅, then Ciq = ∅, ∀q, l ≤ q ≤ n2. We let L(i) = (Ci1 i Ci2 i · · · i
Cin2) and call L(i) the preference list of agent i. We abuse notation and write o ∈ L(i)
if o appears in preference list L(i), i.e., if agent i finds object o acceptable. We say that
agent i ranks object o in kth position if o ∈ Cik. We denote by rank(i, o) the rank of
object o in agent i’s preference list and let rank(i, o) = n2 + 1 if o is not acceptable to
i. Therefore ot i os if and only if rank(i, ot) < rank(i, os), and ot 'i os if and only if
rank(i, ot) = rank(i, os).
Let L = (L(1), L(2), · · · , L(n1)) denote the joint preference list profile of all agents.
We write L(−i) to denote the joint preference list profile of all agents except agent i; i.e.,
L(−i) = (L(1), . . . , L(i− 1), L(i+ 1), . . . , L(n1)). Let L denote the set of all possible joint
preference list profiles. An instance of HA is denoted by I = (N,O,L,W ). We drop W
and write I = (N,O,L) if we are dealing with an instance where agents are not assigned
weights, or equivalently if they all have the same weight. Let I denote the set of all
possible instances of HA.
A matching µ is a subset of N × A such that each agent and object appears in at
most one pair of µ. If (i, o) ∈ µ, agent i and object o are said to be matched together,
and o is the partner of i and vice versa. If (i, o) ∈ µ for some o, we say that i is matched,
and unmatched otherwise. The definitions of matched and unmatched for an object are
analogous. If agent i is matched, µ(i) denotes the object matched to i. Similarly if object
o is matched, µ−1(o) denotes the agent matched to o. In what follows, we will refer to
the underlying graph of I, which is the undirected graph G0 = (V,E) where V = N ∪ O
and E = {(i, o), i ∈ N, o ∈ L(i)}. We also use µ to denote a matching (in the standard
graph-theoretic sense) in G0. The size of a matching µ is equal to the number of agents
matched under µ. In the presence of weights, the weight of a matching is equal to the sum
of the weights of the matched agents.
For two given matchings µ1, µ2, we will frequently use µ1⊕µ2 to denote the symmetric
difference with respect to their sets of edges. An alternating path in G0, given a matching
µ1, is a path that consists of edges that alternately belong to µ1 and do not belong to µ1.
An augmenting path in G0 is an alternating path where the first and the last vertices on
the path are unmatched in µ1. To augment along an augmenting path, given matching
µ1, means that a new matching µ2 is created by removing edges on the path that belong
to µ1 and adding edges on the path that do not belong to µ1.
A matching µ is Pareto optimal if there is no other matching under which some agent
is better off while none is worse off. Formally, µ is Pareto optimal if there is no other
matching µ′ such that (i) µ′(i) i µ(i) for all i ∈ N , and (ii) µ′(i′) i′ µ(i′) for some agent
i′ ∈ N . Manlove [24, Sec. 6.2.2.1] gave a characterisation of Pareto optimal matchings in
instances of HA (potentially with ties) in terms of a number of graph-theoretic structures,
which we will now define.
An alternating path coalition w.r.t. µ comprises a sequence P = 〈i0, i1, . . . , ir−1, ok〉,
for some r ≥ 1, where ij is a matched agent (0 ≤ j ≤ r − 1) and ok is an unmatched
object. If r = 1 then i0 strictly prefers ok to µ(i0). Otherwise, if r ≥ 2, i0 strictly prefers
µ(i1) to µ(i0), ij weakly prefers µ(ij+1) to µ(ij) (1 ≤ j ≤ r − 2), and ir−1 weakly prefers
ok to µ(ir−1).
An augmenting path coalition w.r.t. µ comprises a sequence P = 〈i0, i1, . . . , ir−1, ok〉,
for some r ≥ 1, where i0 is an unmatched agent and ok is an unmatched object. If r = 1
then i0 finds ok acceptable. Otherwise, if r ≥ 2, ij is a matched agent (1 ≤ j ≤ r − 1), i0
finds µ(i1) acceptable, ij weakly prefers µ(ij+1) to µ(ij) (1 ≤ j ≤ r − 2), and ir−1 weakly
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prefers ok to µ(ir−1).
A cyclic coalition w.r.t. µ comprises a sequence of applicants P = 〈i0, i1, . . . , ir−1〉,
for some r ≥ 2, all matched in µ, such that ij weakly prefers µ(ij+1) to µ(ij) for each j
(0 ≤ j ≤ r − 1), and ij strictly prefers µ(ij+1) to µ(ij) for some j (0 ≤ j ≤ r − 1) (all
subscripts are taken modulo r when reasoning about cyclic coalitions).
Proposition 2.1 ([24]). Given an instance I of HA and a matching µ in I, µ is Pareto op-
timal if and only if µ admits no alternating path coalition, no augmenting path coalition,
and no cyclic coalition.
LetM denote the set of all possible matchings. A deterministic mechanism φ maps an
instance of HA to a matching, i.e., φ : I → M. Let R :M→ [0, 1] denote a distribution
over possible matchings (which we also call a random matching); i.e.,
∑
µ∈MR(µ) = 1. A
randomised mechanism φ is a mapping from I to a distribution over possible matchings,
i.e., φ : I → Rand(M), where Rand(M) is the set of all random matchings. A deter-
ministic mechanism is Pareto optimal if it always returns a Pareto optimal matching. A
randomised mechanism is Pareto optimal if it always returns a distribution over Pareto
optimal matchings.
Agents’ preferences are private knowledge and an agent may prefer not to reveal his
preferences truthfully if it is not in his best interests, for a given mechanism. A deter-
ministic mechanism φ is dominant strategy truthful (or truthful) if agents always find it
in their best interests to declare their preferences truthfully, no matter what other agents
declare, i.e., for every joint preference list profile L, for every agent i, and for every pos-
sible declared preference list L′(i) for i, φ(L(i), L(−i)) i φ(L′(i), L(−i)). A randomised
mechanism φ is universally truthful if it is a probability distribution over deterministic
truthful mechanisms.
Denote by w(φ(I)) the (expected) weight of the (random) matching generated by
mechanism φ on instance I ∈ I, and by w(I) the weight of a maximum weight matching
in I. The approximation ratio of φ is then defined as maxI∈I
w(I)
w(φ(I)) . Note that a maximum
weight matching has the same weight as a maximum weight Pareto optimal matching, as
the following proposition shows.
Proposition 2.2. Given an instance I of HA, a maximum weight matching has the same
weight as a maximum weight Pareto optimal matching.
Proof. We provide a procedure for transforming a maximum weight matching µ in I to a
Pareto optimal matching µ′ in I with the same weight.
Let G0 be the underlying graph for I and let G
′
0 be the subgraph of G0 induced by
N ′ ∪A, where N ′ is the set of agents who are matched in µ. Define the cost of each edge
(i, oj) in G
′
0 to be rank(i, oj). Find a maximum cardinality matching µ
′ of minimum cost
in G′0. It is easy to see that µ and µ′ are of the same cardinality and have the same weight,
as they each match all agents in N ′. It remains to show that µ′ is Pareto optimal in I.
If µ′ is not Pareto optimal in I then by Proposition 2.1, µ′ admits a coalition C that is
either an alternating path coalition, or an augmenting path coalition, or a cyclic coalition.
If C is an augmenting path coalition then µ′⊕C has larger weight than µ, a contradiction
as µ is a maximum weight matching. Hence C is an alternating path coalition or a cyclic
coalition. In either case let µ′′ = µ′ ⊕ C. Then |µ′′| = |µ′| but the cost of µ′′ is less than
the cost of µ′, a contradiction as µ′ is a maximum cardinality minimum cost matching in
G′0. Hence µ′ is Pareto optimal in I.
We now give a straightforward lower bound for the approximation ratio of any deter-
ministic truthful mechanism for HA with strict preferences.
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Theorem 2.3. No deterministic truthful mechanism for HA can achieve approximation
ratio better than 2. The result holds even for strict preferences.
Proof. Consider an HA instance I with two agents, 1 and 2, and two objects, o1 and o2.
Assume that both agents have weight 1 and strictly prefer o1 to o2. Then I admits two
matchings of size (weight) 2. Assume, for a contradiction, that there exists a truthful
mechanism φ with approximation ratio strictly smaller than 2. Then in I, φ must pick
one of the two matchings of size 2. Assume, without loss of generality, that φ picks
µ = {(1, o2), (2, o1)}. Now, assume that agent 1 misrepresents his acceptable objects and
declares o1 as the only object acceptable to him. Let I
′ denote the instance of HA so
obtained. As φ is truthful, when executed on I ′ it must not assign o1 to 1, or else 1 finds it
in his best interests to misrepresent his preferences as he would strictly prefer his allocated
object in I ′ to his allocated object in I. Hence φ must return a matching of size at most
1 (by assigning an object to agent 2) when applied to I ′. However, I ′ admits a matching
of size 2, namely µ′ = {(1, o1), (2, o2)}. Therefore the approximation ratio of φ is at least
2, a contradiction.
Corollary 2.4. No deterministic truthful Pareto optimal mechanism for HA can achieve
approximation ratio better than 2. The result holds even for strict preferences.
As mentioned in Section 1, the upper bound of 2 is achievable via SDM for HA with
strict preferences [2]. If weights and ties exist, simply ordering the agents in decreasing
order of their weights and running SDMT-1 (see Algorithm 1 in Section 3) or SDMT-2 (see
Algorithm 2 in Section 4) gives a deterministic truthful and Pareto optimal mechanism
with approximation ratio 2 (Theorem 3.6 in Section 3). This resolves the problem for
deterministic mechanisms and motivates looking into relaxing our requirements. In the
following sections we look for randomised truthful mechanisms that construct ‘large’ weight
Pareto optimal matchings.
3 First truthful mechanism: SDMT-1
3.1 Introduction
When preferences are strict, SDM produces a Pareto optimal matching. However when
indifference is allowed, finding an arbitrary Pareto optimal matching is not as straightfor-
ward as in the case of strict preferences, as illustrated via an example in Section 1.
In Section 3.2 we introduce SDMT-1, Serial Dictatorship Mechanism with Ties, a
mechanism that generalises SDM to the case where agents’ preferences may involve ties.
Then in Section 3.3, we show that SDMT-1 is truthful and is guaranteed to produce a
Pareto optimal matching. We further show that SDMT-1 is capable of generating any
given Pareto optimal matching.
3.2 Mechanism SDMT-1
Let I = (N,O,L) be an instance of HA, and let a fixed order σ of the agents be given.
Assume, w.l.o.g., that σ(i) = i for all agents i ∈ N . The formal description of SDMT-1 is
given in Algorithm 1; an informal description follows.
SDMT-1 constructs an undirected bipartite graph G = (V,E) where V = N∪O and the
set of edges E changes during the execution of SDMT-1; initially E = ∅. The mechanism
returns a matching µ; initially µ = ∅. It then proceeds in n1 phases, where each phase
corresponds to one iteration of the for loop in Algorithm 1. In phase i, agent i is considered
and the objects in i’s preference list are examined in the order of the indifference classes
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Algorithm 1: Serial Dictatorship Mechanism with Ties, version 1 (SDMT-1)
Input: Agents N ; Objects O; Preference list profile L; An order of agents σ
Output: Matching µ
Let G = (N ∪O,E), E ← ∅, µ← ∅.
for each agent i ∈ N in the order of σ do
Let `← 1
Step (*): if Ci` 6= ∅ then
E ← E ∪ {(i, o) : o ∈ Ci`}; // all new edges are non-matching edges
if there is an augmenting path from i in G then
augment along this path and update µ accordingly; // i is provisionally
allocated some o ∈ Ci` and (i, o) is now a matching edge
end
else
E ← E \ {(i, o) : o ∈ Ci`}
`← `+ 1; Go to Step (*)
end
end
end
Return µ; //each matched agent is allocated his matched object
they belong to. Recall that Ci` denotes the `’th indifference class of agent i. When objects
o ∈ Ci` are examined, edges (i, o) are provisionally added to E for all o ∈ Ci`. We then
check whether µ admits an augmenting path in G that starts from agent i. If such a path
exists, we augment along that path and modify µ accordingly. This would mean that agent
i is assigned some o ∈ Ci` and every other agent already matched is assigned an object
that he ranks in the same indifference class his previous object. Otherwise – if µ admits
no augmenting path in G – edges (i, o) are removed from E for all o ∈ Ci`. In general, once
an agent i is assigned an object o ∈ Ci` he will remain matched in µ, although he may be
required to exchange o for another object in Ci` in order to allow a newly-arrived agent to
receive o.
Notice that, at any stage of the mechanism, an edge (i, o) belongs to E if and only if
either agent i is matched in µ and o 'i µ(i), or SDMT-1 is at phase i and examining the
indifference class to which o belongs. Therefore, it is fairly straightforward to observe the
following.
Observation 3.1. At the end of phase i of SDMT-1, if agent i is assigned no object then
he will be assigned no object when SDMT-1 terminates. Otherwise, if i is provisionally
assigned an object o, then he will be allocated an object that he ranks the same as o in the
final matching.
3.3 Properties of SDMT-1
Before proceeding to prove our main claim, namely that SDMT-1 is truthful and produces
a Pareto optimal matching, let us discuss a relevant concept that is both interesting in
its own right and useful in the proofs that follow. In practice agents may have priorities
and the mechanism designer may wish to ensure that the agents with higher priorities are
served before satisfying those with lower priorities. Roth et al. [31] studied this concept
under the term priority matchings in the case where each agent’s preference list is one
single tie. This work was motivated by the kidney exchange problem in which patients are
assigned priorities based on various criteria; e.g., children and hard-to-match patients have
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higher priorities. Prior to Roth et al. [31], Svensson [35] studied a similar concept under
the name queue allocation in a setting similar to ours. We formally define this concept
using the terminology strong priority matching, reflecting both the definition in [31] and
the fact that preference lists are more general than single ties.
In general, assume that we are given an ordering of the agents σ = i1, . . . , in1 . However,
recall that in this section we are assuming, without loss of generality, that ij = j, i.e.,
σ = 1, 2, . . . , n1. For each matching µ, the signature of µ w.r.t. σ, denoted by ρ(µ, σ), is a
vector 〈ρ1, . . . , ρn1〉 where for each i ∈ [n1], ρi = rank(i, µ(i)) if i is matched under µ, and
ρi = n2 +1 otherwise. A matching µ is a strong priority matching (SPM) w.r.t. σ if ρ(µ, σ)
is lexicographically minimum, taken over all matchings µ. That is, (i) the highest priority
agent 1 has one of his first-choice objects (assuming L(1) 6= ∅); (ii) subject to (i), there
is no matching µ′ such that µ′(2) 2 µ(2), where 2 is the agent with the second-highest
priority; (iii) subject to (i) and (ii), there is no matching µ′′ such that µ′′(3) 3 µ(3),
where 3 is the agent with the third-highest priority, etc. It is easy to see that a given HA
instance may admit more than one SPM w.r.t. σ, but all of them have the same signature.
When σ is fixed and known, we simply say that µ is an SPM.
Theorem 3.2. The matching produced by SDMT-1 is a strong priority matching w.r.t. σ.
Proof. Let µk denote the matching at the end of phase k (hence µn1 = µ). Assume, for a
contradiction, that the claim does not hold. Hence µ is not an SPM in I. Let µ∗ be an
SPM in I. Let i be the first agent in σ (i.e., the lowest-indexed agent) who strictly prefers
his partner under µ∗ to his partner under µ, i.e., µ∗(i) i µ(i) and µ∗(j) 'j µ(j), ∀j < i
(we denote this fact by D1). Therefore, in phase i of SDMT-1 no augmenting path has
been found starting from (i, o), for any object o such that o i µ∗(i) (we denote this fact
by D2). Also, it follows from D1 and Observation 3.1 that, µ∗(j) 'j µi−1(j), ∀j < i (we
denote this fact by D3).
Let G∗ denote the graph G in phase i during the examination of the indifference class
to which µ∗(i) belongs. By D2, G∗ must admit no augmenting path w.r.t. µi−1. We show,
however, that G∗ admits an augmenting path starting from i. To see this note that, by
D1 and D3, and by the construction of edges E, edges (j, µ∗(j)) belong to G∗ ∀j < i.
If µ∗(i) is unmatched in µi−1 then (i, µ∗(i)) constitutes an augmenting path of size 1 in
G∗. Otherwise, let j1 denote the partner of µ∗(i) under µi−1 (note that j1 < i). It follows
from D1 and D3, and the construction of E, that j1 is matched under µ
∗. If µ∗(j1) is
unmatched under µi−1 then we have found an augmenting path of length 3. Otherwise,
let j2 denote the partner of µ
∗(j1) under µi−1 (note that j2 < i). The same argument we
used for j1 can be used for j2, resulting in either the discovery of an augmenting path of
size 5 or reaching a new agent. We can repeatedly use this argument and each time we
either find an augmenting path (and stop) or visit an agent that appears in σ before i. As
each agent is assigned at most one object in every matching, and vice versa, the agents jr
that we encounter on our search for an augmenting path are all distinct. Therefore, since
there are a finite number of agents and objects, we are bound to reach an object o that is
unmatched under µi−1, hence exposing an augmenting path in G∗, a contradiction.
Corollary 3.3. The matching produced by SDMT-1 is a Pareto optimal matching.
Proof. By Theorem 3.2, SDMT-1 produces an SPM. It follows from Theorems 1 and 2
in [35] that any SPM is a Pareto optimal matching. Hence, the matching produced by
SDMT-1 is a Pareto optimal matching.
SDMT-1 is truthful, no matter which augmenting path is selected in each phase of the
mechanism, as the next result shows. The proof idea is as follows. Note that when an
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agent’s turn arrives, SDMT-1 assigns him an object from what the algorithm identifies as
his “best possible indifference class”; i.e., the top-most indifference class from which he
can be assigned an object without harming any previously-arrived agent. Then as soon
as he is assigned an object, by Observation 3.1, he is guaranteed to be allocated the same
object, or one that he equally values, when the algorithm terminates. Hence, as long as we
can show that the algorithm correctly identifies these “best possible indifference classes”,
it is straightforward to see that no agent can benefit from misreporting. The proof of the
next theorem formalises this argument.
Theorem 3.4. The mechanism SDMT-1 is truthful.
Proof. Assume, for a contradiction, that the claim does not hold. Let i be the first agent
in σ (i.e., the lowest-indexed agent) who benefits from misrepresenting his preferences and
reporting L′(i) instead of L(i). Let L′ = (L′(i), L(−i)).
Let µ denote the matching returned by SMDT-1 on instance I = (N,O,L), i.e., the
instance in which agent i reports truthfully, and let µ∗ denote the matching returned on
instance I ′ = (N,O,L′). Then in I, µ∗(i) i µ(i) and µ(j) j µ∗(j), ∀j < i.
By Theorem 3.2, µ is an SPM in I, and µ∗ is an SPM in I ′. Suppose that in I,
µ(j) j µ∗(j), for some j < i. Let k be the smallest integer such that µ(k) k µ∗(k) in
I. As k < i, for each j (1 ≤ j ≤ k), agent j has the same preference list in I and I ′, by
construction of L′. Hence µ∗ cannot be an SPM in I ′ after all, a contradiction.
It follows that in I, µ∗(i) i µ(i) and µ(j) 'j µ∗(j), ∀j < i. We now obtain a
contradiction to the fact that µ is an SPM in I.
We now show a bound on the time complexity of SDMT-1. Let γ denote the size of
the largest indifference class for a given instance I.
Theorem 3.5. SDMT-1 terminates in time O(n21γ+m).
Proof. For each agent i matched under µ, let `i denote the length of the indifference class
to which µ(i) belongs. Let |L(i)| denote the length of agent i’s preference list, ∀i ∈ N .
Searching for an augmenting path in a graph G = (V,E) can be done in time O(|E|) using
Breadth-First Search (BFS). Hence the search for an augmenting path in each phase i can
be done in time O(`1 + `2 + · · · + `i−1 + |L(i)|). Therefore SDMT-1 terminates in time
O((n1−1) · `1 +(n1−2)`2 + · · ·+ `n1−1 +
∑
i∈N |L(i)|). However, `i ≤ γ, ∀i ∈ N , therefore
(n1 − 1) · `1 + (n1 − 2)`2 + · · ·+ `n1−1 +
∑
i∈N |L(i)| ≤ n21γ + m, where m is the number
of (agent,object) acceptable pairs. Hence SDMT-1 terminates in time O(n21γ+m).
As noted in Section 1, in the strict preferences case, any Pareto optimal matching is
at least half the size of a maximum size such matching. The same is true in the general
case with indifferences, since any Pareto optimal matching is a maximal matching in the
underlying bipartite graph G0 for I, and any maximal matching in G0 is at least half the
size of a maximum matching in G0 [23]. Hence SDMT-1 obviously achieves approximation
ratio 2 when we are concerned with the cardinality of the matching. We next show that,
when agents are assigned arbitrary weights, SDMT-1 achieves the same approximation
ratio (relative to a maximum weight Pareto optimal matching) if the agents are ordered
in σ in non-increasing order of their weights.
Theorem 3.6. SDMT-1 achieves approximation ratio of 2 relative to the size of a max-
imum weight Pareto optimal matching, if the agents are ordered in σ in non-increasing
order of their weights.
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Proof. Given an HA instance I, let µ be the matching produced by SDMT-1 and let µ′
be a maximum weight Pareto optimal matching in I. List the agents matched under each
of these matchings in non-increasing order of weight. Let i1, . . . , ik denote such an order
under µ, and let i′1, . . . , i′l denote such an order under µ
′.
Take any agent i′r who is matched under µ′, to say o, but not matched under µ (if
no such agent exists then µ is itself a maximum weight Pareto optimal matching). Note
that, as µ is Pareto optimal, o must be matched under µ, for otherwise µ∪{(i′r, o)} Pareto
dominates µ. As SDMT-1 generates an SPM w.r.t. σ (Theorem 3.2) and agents are listed
in non-increasing order of weight under σ, it follows that o must be allocated in µ to an
agent is who has at least as large a weight as i
′
r (for otherwise (µ \ {(is, o)})∪{(i′r, o)} has
a lexicographically smaller signature than µ, a contradiction).
We claim that is must be matched under µ
′ as well, as otherwise (µ′\{(i′r, o)})∪{(is, o)}
has a higher weight than µ′, a contradiction. (Recall that a maximum weight Pareto
optimal matching must be a maximum weight matching as well by Proposition 2.2.) Hence
we have established that, for each agent i′r matched under µ′ but not matched under µ,
there exists a unique agent is, with weight at least as large as that of i
′
r, who is matched
under µ. Thus if N1 is the set of agents matched in µ
′ and N2 is the set of agents matched
in µ, it follows that wt(N2) ≥ wt(N1\N2), where wt(N ′) is the sum of the weights of the
agents in N ′, for N ′ ⊆ N . Also wt(N2) = wt(N2\N1) + wt(N2 ∩ N1) ≥ wt(N2 ∩ N1) =
wt(N1)− wt(N1\N2) ≥ wt(N1)− wt(N2), hence the result.
It is known (see, e.g., [2]) that, in the case of strict preferences, not only can we find a
Pareto optimal matching using SDM, but we can also generate all Pareto optimal match-
ings by executing SDM on all possible permutations of the agents. In other words, given
any Pareto optimal matching µ, there exists an order of the agents such that executing
SDM on that order returns µ. A similar characterisation of Pareto optimal matchings
holds in the case of preferences with ties. This is stated by the following result, whose
proof is given in the Appendix.
Theorem 3.7. Any Pareto optimal matching can be generated by some execution of
SDMT-1.
4 Randomised mechanism with weights and ties
In this section we will analyse our mechanism for the weighted version of our problem. Our
algorithm in the next section is truthful with respect to agents’ preferences and weights
(under the no-overbidding assumption, see also the beginning of Section 6) and provides
an ee−1 -approximate Pareto optimal matching. We will show in Section 6 that, even if the
weights of all agents are the same our algorithm uses the best possible random strategy –
no other such strategy leads to better than ee−1 -approximate matching.
4.1 Second truthful mechanism: SDMT-2
The approximation ratio analysis of the randomised version of SDMT-1 is complex, be-
cause it requires additional information which is not maintained by SDMT-1. For the
sake of the analysis, we introduce a variant of SDMT-1, called SDMT-2. After introduc-
ing some terminology we present SDMT-2, and then establish the equivalence between
SDMT-1 and SDMT-2. Pareto optimality and truthfulness of SDMT-2 will then follow
from this equivalence and these same two properties of SDMT-1. We will prove that
the randomised version of SDMT-2 is ee−1 -approximate. By the equivalence of the two
algorithms, a randomised version of SDMT-1 has the same approximation ratio.
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Agent 7
(d, e, g, h)
Unlabelled 5
(b, c, e, g)
Unlabelled 3
(d, h, f, o)
Unlabelled 6
(a, h, o)
Unlabelled 4
(e, f, p)
Labelled 1
(a, b, c, d, e)
Labelled 2
(f, p)
Figure 1: The trading graph TG(7, {g, h}, [6]), h denotes h is owned currently by the
agent. Objects in the parentheses below each agent represent a single indifference class of
that agent. The common order of the objects is a  b  c  d  e  f  g  h  o  p
(used in the text below).
Let o1  o2  · · ·  on2 be a common order of all the objects. This order will be used to
break possible ties in SDMT-2. In what follows we will use use lower case letters from the
beginning of the alphabet to name individual objects, e.g., a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h. We define
now some notions that will be used to describe algorithm SDMT-2. These definitions
will refer to any time point during an execution of this algorithm. In the course of the
algorithm agents will be (temporarily) allocated subsets of objects from their preference
list. When an agent is allocated a subset of objects we say that he owns these objects.
Let S ⊆ N and suppose that some of the agents in S have been allocated some objects
and the allocated objects to each agent appear in the same indifference class of this agent.
At any time during the execution of the algorithm, each agent who is allocated more than
one object is called labelled and unlabelled otherwise. Likewise, at any point during the
execution of the algorithm, let i ∈ N , and let B ⊆ L(i) be such that i is not currently
allocated any object in B. The trading graph (TG) is a directed graph TG(i, B, S) with
{i} ∪ S as the set of nodes, and arcs defined as follows: Let agent i point to each agent
in S who owns any object in B. For each unlabelled agent, e.g., j ∈ S, to which i points,
suppose the current object allocated to j is in j’s kth indifference class Cjk. Then let j
point to each agent in S who currently owns any object in Cjk not owned by j. Continue
this process for the new pointed-to and unlabelled agents until no agent in S needs to
point to other agents. See Figure 1 for an example of how TG(7, {g, h}, [6]) is constructed:
agent 7 points to agent 5 and 6 since currently agent 5 owns g and agent 6 owns h; then,
as agent 5 is unlabelled, agent 5 points to agents 4 and 1 since agent 4 owns e and agent
1 owns b and c; similarly, agent 6 points to agents 1 and 3; agent 3 points to 1 and 6; only
agents 1 and 2 are labelled.
LetH = {a ∈ L(i) | there is a (directed) path from i to a labelled agent in TG(i, a, S)} .
Note that, as labelled agents do not point to any agents, no intermediate agent on a di-
rected path is labelled. Note that H may be empty, and it can be found, for instance,5
by breadth first search (BFS). If H 6= ∅, let ` be the highest indifference class of i with
H ∩ Ci` 6= ∅. Define maxTG(i, L(i), S) to be the highest order object in H ∩ Ci` (e.g., in
Figure 1, maxTG(7, {d, e, g, h}, [6]) = g). We also explicitly define maxTG(i, L(i), S) = ∅
if H = ∅. If maxTG(i, L(i), S) 6= ∅, then there is a path from i to a labelled agent
5Here, what only matters is the reachability, that is, existence of such directed path in TG(i, a, S) from
agent i to a labelled agent.
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Algorithm 2: Serial Dictatorship Mechanism with Ties, version 2 (SDMT-2)
Input: Agents N ; Objects O; Preference list profile L; An order of agents σ,
w.l.o.g. let σ(i) = i, ∀i ∈ N
Output: Matching
Let O1 ← O // O1 is the set of currently unallocated objects
for each agent i ∈ N in the order of σ do
Define j1 =
{
min{j : Oi ∩ Cij 6= ∅} ifOi ∩ L(i) 6= ∅;
n2 + 1 otherwise.
j2 =
{
min{j : maxTG(i, L(i), [i− 1]) ∈ Cij} if maxTG(i, L(i), [i− 1]) 6= ∅;
n2 + 1 otherwise.
if j1 ≤ j2 then
Allocate all the objects in Oi ∩ Cij1 to i; Label i if |Oi ∩ Cij1 | ≥ 2;
Oi+1 ← Oi\(Oi ∩ Cij1)
end
else
Trading(i,maxTG(i, L(i), [i− 1]), [i− 1]); Oi+1 ← Oi
end
end
For each labelled agent, allocate to him the highest order object he currently owns.
For each unlabelled agent, if he currently owns an object, allocate it to him.
Output the matching.
in TG(i, a, S), which can be found by BFS. Suppose the path is (i0, i1, i2, · · · , ik), where
i0 = i and only ik is labelled. Now denote Trading(i, a, S) to be a procedure that allocates
the object owned by is+1 to is, for s = 0, 1, · · · , k − 1. Note that ik may own more than
one object for which ik−1 has pointed to ik. In this case, the highest order object among
such objects is allocated to ik−1. After trading, if ik still owns more than one object, keep
ik labelled and unlabel ik otherwise. In Figure 1, considering procedure Trading(7, g, [6]),
we note that there are two paths from agent 7 to a labelled agent: (7, 5, 1) and (7, 5, 4, 2).
Procedure Trading(7, g, [6]) can use any of those two paths. If Trading(7, g, [6]) uses the
first path, then it allocates g to agent 7 and b to agent 5, since b  c, and keeps agent 1
labelled. If procedure Trading(7, g, [6]) uses the second path, then it allocates g to agent
7 and e to agent 5, anf f to agent 4, since f  p, and changes agent 2 to unlabelled.
Recall that Cin2+1 = ∅, ∀i ∈ [n1]. With these preliminaries, we present our algorithm
SDMT-2 (see Algorithm 2). In the following, we will refer to kth iteration of the “for loop”
in SDMT-2 as the kth loop. Observe that in the kth loop, j1 is the highest indifference
class of i where i can obtain unallocated objects, and j2 is the highest indifference class of
i where i can obtain objects from the allocated objects without hurting the agents prior
to i.
Observation 4.1. For each agent i, after i’s turn in “for loop” of SDMT-2, if i is allocated
no object, then he will be allocated no object when SDMT-2 terminates. Otherwise, if i
is provisionally allocated some objects in his turn, then in the final matching he will be
allocated an object in the same indifference class as his initially allocated objects.
Observation 4.2. For each agent i, after i’s turn, if i is allocated an object o ∈ Cij, then
all the objects in ∪jk=1Cik have been allocated to either i or to some agents prior to i. Once
an object is allocated, it remains allocated until the end of the for loop.
Now we establish the equivalence of SDMT-1 and SDMT-2.
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Theorem 4.3. Given the same input, SDMT-1 and SDMT-2 match the same set of
agents. Furthermore, for each matched agent i, the object allocated to i in SDMT-1 is in
the same indifference class of i as the object allocated to him in SDMT-2. This equivalence
between SDMT-1 and SDMT-2 holds for any fixed common order  of the objects used in
SDMT-2 and it is also independent of how SDMT-2 finds the directed paths from agent i
to a labelled agent in the trading graph TG(i, L(i), [i− 1]).
Proof. We will prove the following two facts inductively which simply implies the conclu-
sion of Theorem 4.3. Without loss of generality, suppose the order of agents is σ(i) = i,
∀i ∈ N . Until the step i,
1. for each agent k ≤ i− 1, the allocated objects of SDMT-1 and SDMT-2 to k are in
the same indifference class, (if one of them is empty, the other is empty as well)
2. for each ` ≤ n2, and a ∈ Ci`, there is an augmenting path starting from (i, a) in
SDMT-1 if and only if a is unallocated in SDMT-2 or there is a path from i to a
labelled agent in TG(i, a, [i− 1]) in SDMT-2.
Consider the base case, for agent 1, obviously property 1 is true since they are all empty
sets. Now, for property 2, let ` ≤ n2 and a ∈ C1` , then there is an augmenting path
from (1, a) in SDMT-1 and a is unallocated in SDMT-2. This shows both implications of
property 2 for agent 1.
For the proof of the induction step, suppose properties 1 and 2 are true for all the steps
k ≤ i − 1, we now prove that they are true for step i. For property 1, by inductive
hypothesis, property 1 holds for any k ≤ i− 2. Since property 2 holds for agent i− 1 by
inductive hypothesis, the objects allocated to agent i− 1 in SDMT-1 and SDMT-2 will be
in the same indifference class, thus, property 1 holds for step i. Now property 2 will be
proved true for agent i, for each ` ≤ n2, and a ∈ Ci`:
For ⇒ direction, if there is an augmenting path starting from (i, a) in SDMT-1, and
if a is allocated previously in SDMT-2, suppose the new matching generated in SDMT-1
due to the augmenting path is (k, µ(k)), k ≤ i, where µ(i) = a. By property 1 of inductive
hypothesis and Observation 4.2, all the objects in {µ(k), k ≤ i} have been allocated to
some agents k ≤ i− 1 in SDMT-2. For object b, we use ν−1(b) to denote the agent whom
b is allocated to in SDMT-2. Now consider the following path in TG(i, a, [i − 1]): let
i1 = ν
−1(µ(i)), and if i1 is labelled then we are done, otherwise, let i2 = ν−1(µ(i1)). If
i2 is labelled, then we are done, otherwise continue this process. Finally, we will reach
by this process a labelled agent among the agents in [i − 1]. This is true because of the
pigeonhole principle: i objects from {µ(k), k ≤ i} are allocated in SDMT-2 to i− 1 agents
in [i− 1].
For ⇐ direction, now suppose a is unallocated or there is a path from i to a labelled
agent in TG(i, a, [i − 1]) in SDMT-2. Suppose a is allocated and there is a path from i
to a labelled agent in TG(i, a, [i− 1]). Then by Trading(i, a, [i− 1]), we can make all the
agents k ≤ i allocated at least one object and i is allocated a. This defines an allocation
of (sets of) objects to agents k ≤ i in SDMT-2. Let us now select any matching using
this allocation, e.g., M = {(k, ν(k)), k ≤ i}, where ν(i) = a (we can also select such a
matching if a is unallocated in SDMT-2). For instance, matching ν can assign the hightest
order object to each agent k ≤ i − 1 from the current set of objects allocated to k, and
assign object a to agent i. Suppose the matching generated after step i − 1 in SDMT-1
is M ′ = {(k, µ(k)), k ≤ i − 1}. By property 1 of inductive hypothesis, we know µ(k)
and ν(k) are in the same indifference class of agent k, for any k ∈ [i − 1]. Now consider
M ⊕M ′, which consists of alternating paths and cycles. Then a connected component of
M⊕M ′ that contains (i, ν(i)) must be an odd length alternating path in M⊕M ′ w.r.t. M ′,
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Algorithm 3: Random SDMT-2 for Weighted Agents with Ties
Input: Agents N ; Objects O; Preference list profile L; Weights W
Output: Matching
for each agent i ∈ N do
Pick Yi ∈ [0, 1] uniformly at random;
end
Sort agents in decreasing order of wi(1− eYi−1) (break ties in favour of smaller
index);
Run SDMT-2 according to above order;
Return the matching;
implying an augmenting path starting from (i, a) in SDMT-1. The argument showing that
the connected component that contains (i, ν(i)) must be an odd length alternating path is
as follows. If ν(i) = a is unallocated in SDMT-1, then (i, ν(i)) is an odd length alternating
path. Otherwise, suppose i1 = µ
−1(ν(i)), then consider whether ν(i1) is allocated or not
in SDMT-1. If not we get an odd path (i, ν(i), i1, ν(i1)). Otherwise continue the search,
and let i2 = µ
−1(ν(i1)), then consider whether ν(i2) is allocated or not in SDMT-1. If not
we get an odd length path (i, ν(i), i1, ν(i1), i2, ν(i2)), and so on. Finally, we will get an
odd length alternating path starting from (i, ν(i)) = (i, a) w.r.t. M ′, which is indeed an
augmenting path starting from (i, a) in SDMT-1. This concludes the proof of the induction
step.
It is easy to see that both SDMT-1 and SDMT-2 reduce to SDM if all agents have
strict preference over objects.
Theorem 4.4. SDMT-2 is truthful, Pareto optimal, and terminates in O(n21γ +m) run-
ning time.
Proof. The first two properties follow from the equivalence between SDMT-1 and SDMT-2
(Theorem 4.3) and the Pareto optimality (Corollary 3.3) and truthfulness (Theorem 3.4)
of SDMT-1. It remains to establish the running time of SDMT-2.
By the previous analysis given in the proof of Theorem 3.5, in each loop iteration i,
the running time is O(|L(i)|+ (i− 1)γ). Summing i over [n1], we obtain that the running
time of SDMT-2 is O(m+ n21γ).
4.2 Randomised mechanism
We now present a universally truthful and Pareto optimal mechanism with approximation
ratio of ee−1 , where agents may have weights and their preferences may involve ties (see
Algorithm 3, where eYi−1 = g(Yi)). Note that in the absence of agents’ weights, sorting
agents in the decreasing order of wi(1− g(Yi) simply means to sort them in the increasing
order of the Yi values, so the exponentiation is only used for the correct handling of the
weights.
When preferences are strict, Algorithm 3 reduces to a variant of RSDM that has been
used in weighted online bipartite matching with approximation ratio ee−1 (see [3] and
[16]). Our analysis of Algorithm 3 is a non-trivial extension of the primal-dual analysis
from [16] to the case where agents’ preferences may involve ties. Before analysing the
approximation ratio, we will argue about the universal truthfulness of Algorithm 3 when
agents’ preferences are private and they in addition have weights.
If the weights are public, Algorithm 3 is universally truthful and Pareto optimal. This
is because it chooses a random order of the agents, given the weights, and then runs
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SDMT-2 according to this order. It follows by inspection of SDMT-2 that, if the order of
the other agents is given, an agent can get a better object if he appears earlier in this order.
Then it is not difficult to see that if the weights are private, and under the assumption that
no agent is allowed to bid over his private weight (the so-called no-overbidding assumption
– see the beginning of Section 6), Algorithm 3 is still universally truthful in the sense that
no agent will lie about his preferences or weight.
Theorem 4.5. Algorithm 3 is universally truthful, even if the weights and preference lists
of the agents are their private knowledge, assuming that no agent can over-bid his weight.
Proof. Algorithm 3 is a distribution over deterministic mechanisms due to the selection
of random variables Yi. For each deterministic mechanism (i.e., SDMT-2 when Yi, i ∈ N
is fixed), we prove that it is truthful with respect to weights and preference lists. Let us
denote by φ the mechanism of SDMT-2 when Yi, i ∈ N is fixed. If is not difficult to see
that for any (W,L), w′i ≤ wi and L′(−i), i ∈ N , we have φi(W,L) i φi((w′i, w−i), L) i
φi((w
′
i, w−i), (L
′(i), L(−i))). The first preferred order in this chain follows from the fact
that the order of i when i bids wi is better than or equal to his order when he bids w
′
i. The
second preferred order in this chain follows by the truthfulness of SDMT-2 when weights
are public.
5 Analysis of the approximation ratio
To gain some high-level intuition behind our extension from strict preferences to prefer-
ences with ties, we highlight here the similarities and differences between our problem
and that of online bipartite matching. Our problem with strict preferences and without
weights is closely related to online bipartite matching.6 If each agent in our problem ranks
his desired objects in the order that precisely follows the arrival order of objects in the
online bipartite matching, the two problems are equivalent. Therefore, we extend the
analysis of this particular setting, where each agent’s preference list is a sublist of a global
preference list, to the general case where agents preferences are not constrained and may
involve ties, and furthermore agents may have weights.
To analyze the approximation ratio of Algorithm 3, we first write the LP formulation
of the (relaxed) problem and its dual LP formulation. Given random variables Yi, we
will define a primal solution and a dual solution obtained by Algorithm 3, which are both
random variables, such that the objective value of the primal solution is always at least a
fraction F of the objective value of the dual solution, and that the expectation of duals is
feasible. Hence, the expectation of the primal solution is at least F times the expectation
of duals, which by weak LP duality, is at least the optimal value of the primal LP. We now
give the standard LP and its dual of our problem. In what follows, G = (V,E), where
V = N ∪O and E = {(i, a), i ∈ N, a ∈ O}.
max
∑
(i,a)∈E wixia such that min
∑
i∈N αi +
∑
a∈O βa such that
∀i ∈ N : ∑a:(i,a)∈E xia ≤ 1 ∀(i, a) ∈ E : αi + βa ≥ wi
∀a ∈ O : ∑i:(i,a)∈E xia ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ N : αi ≥ 0
∀(i, a) ∈ E : xia ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ O : βa ≥ 0
6In the online bipartite matching problem [8], vertices of one partition (think of them as agents) are
given and fixed, while vertices of the other partition (think of them as objects) arrive in an adversarial
order. When an item arrives, we get to see the incident edges on agents. These edges indicate the set of
agents that desire this object. The algorithm must immediately match this object to one of the unmatched
agents desiring it (or choose to throw it away). In the end, the size of the obtained matching is compared
with the optimum matching in the realised graph.
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By the next result, proved in [16], the inverse of approximation ratio is F ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 5.1 ([16]). Suppose that a randomised primal-dual algorithm has a primal feasible
solution with value P (which is a random variable) and a dual solution which is not
necessarily feasible, with value D (which is also a random variable) such that
1. for some universal constant F , P ≥ F ·D, always, and
2. the expectation of the randomised dual variables forms a feasible dual solution, that
is, E(αi) and E(βa) are dual feasible.
The expectation of P is then at least F · OPT where OPT is the value of the optimum
solution.
Proof. Since P ≥ F · D, taking expectations, E(P ) ≥ F · E(D). The cost of the dual
solution obtained by taking expectations of the dual random variables is E(D) and they
form a feasible dual solution, therefore E(D) ≥ OPT. Hence, E(P ) ≥ F ·OPT.
Note that in Lemma 5.1, OPT is the weight of maximum weight matching, which is
equal to the weight of a maximum weight Pareto optimal matching by Proposition 2.2.
Hence, if the condition of Lemma 5.1 holds, the approximation ratio of the mechanism is
1
F . The construction of the duals depends on function g. Let F = (1− 1e ). For any random
selection of Yi, i ∈ N , let ~Y = (Y1, Y2, · · · , Yn1) = (Yi, Y−i). Following the procedure of
Algorithm 3, whenever agent i is matched to object a, let
xia(~Y ) = 1, αi(~Y ) = wig(Yi)/F, βa(~Y ) = wi(1− g(Yi))/F.
For all unmatched i and a, set xia(~Y ) = αi(~Y ) = βa(~Y ) = 0. By this definition, it follows
that for any Yi, i ∈ N , the random value P of the primal solution {xia(~Y ), i ∈ N, a ∈ A}
is always identical to F ·D, where D is the random value of the dual solution {αi(~Y ), i ∈
N, βa(~Y ), a ∈ O}.
Hence, to satisfy the conditions of Lemma 5.1, we need to show that the expectation
of the dual solution {αi(~Y ), i ∈ N, βa(~Y ), a ∈ O} is feasible for the dual LP, implying
that the approximation ratio of Algorithm 3 is at most 1F =
e
e−1 . The main technical
difficulty lies in proving the dominance lemma and the monotonicity lemma (see Lemma
5.4 and 5.6). To prove these two lemmas, for any fixed agent i, and any fixed object a ∈ O,
we define a threshold, denoted by θ = θia, of the random variable for Yi, which specifies
whether agent i will get matched – see Lemma 5.4. This threshold will depend on the
other agents Yi−. For an agent with strict preferences, such a threshold is the same as
that defined in the online bipartite matching problem. However, in the presence of ties,
the same defined threshold does not work. We show how to define such a threshold for
our algorithm.
Let us fix an agent i ∈ [n1] and object a ∈ O, such that (i, a) ∈ E. Also, we fix Y−i,
that is, the random variables Yi′ for all other agents i
′ 6= i. We use σ to denote the order of
agents under Y−i, i.e., σ(1) is the first agent, and so on, and σ([i]) = {σ(1), σ(2), · · · , σ(i)}.
Consider Algorithm 3 running on the instance without agent i and let us denote this
procedure by ALG−i, where σ is the order of agents under ALG−i. Given agent i and
object a, the threshold θ = θia is then defined as follows:
1. If a is unmatched in ALG−i, let θ = 1.
2. Otherwise, suppose that a is matched in ALG−i to some agent i′. Then consider the
allocations just after the “for loop” in SDMT-2 within ALG−i terminated.
If i′ is labelled, set θ = 1.
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3. Otherwise, suppose a ∈ Ci′j and construct the trading graph TG(i′, Ci
′
j \{a}, [n1]\{i})
from all the objects in Ci
′
j other than a (note that σ([n1 − 1]) = [n1]\{i}). Recall
that graph TG(i′, Ci′j \{a}, [n1]\{i}) contains directed paths to all agents who can
potentially provide an object for i′ to trade without affecting any other agent.
If there is a path in TG(i′, Ci′j \{a}, [n1]\{i}) from i′ to a labelled agent, set θ = 1.
4. Otherwise, define
i′′ = argmin`{w`(1− g(Y`))| there is a path from i′ to ` in TG(i′, Ci′j \{a}, [n1]\{i})}
Note: If index ` with minimum value of w`(1 − g(Y`)) is not unique, we take for i′′
the largest such index. Also, observe that either i′ = i′′ or agent i′ is before i′′ with
respect to order σ.
If wi(1− g(y)) = wi′′(1− g(Yi′′)) has a solution y ∈ [0, 1] define θ to be this solution.
(g(y) is strictly increasing so if there is a solution, it is unique)
5. Otherwise define θ to be 0.
Now consider Algorithm 3 running on the original instance (denote such procedure as
ALG), with (Yi, Y−i) fixed. Suppose that τ is the order of agents under this execution
of ALG. The intuition behind the definition of θ is the following. Having Y−i fixed, we
want to define θ such that if we run ALG with (Yi, Y−i) where Yi < θ, then agent i gets
matched. If 1. holds, then Yi < 1 and i will be matched because at least object a is his
available candidate. If 2. happens, then Yi < 1 and i will also be matched because object
a can be re-allocated from the labelled agent i′ to i. Case 3. is analogous to 2. with the
only difference that we now have a trading path from i′ to a labelled agent. Finally, case
4. will be discussed just after Observation 5.3.
In our further analysis, we will need the following notion of a frozen agent or object.
Definition 5.2. We say an agent (respectively, an object) is frozen if the allocation of
this agent (respectively, object) remains the same until the termination of SDMT-2. We
also say a trading graph is frozen if all of its agents are frozen.
Observation 5.3. Assume that agent i is unmatched in his turn in the “for loop” of
ALG. Suppose τ(u) = i, which means i selects his object in u-th iteration of the “for
loop”. Then at the end of the k-th iteration of the “for loop”, for every k ≥ u, there is no
path from i to a labelled agent in TG(i, L(i), τ([k])), meaning this graph is frozen.
Proof. By SDMT-2, we know that Ou∩L(τ(u)) = Ou∩L(i) = ∅, which means that all the
objects in L(i) have been allocated to agents τ([u− 1]). Since τ(u) is unmatched, there is
no path from τ(u) to any labelled agent in TG(τ(u), L(τ(u)), τ([u−1])). Let S ⊆ τ([u−1])
be the set that is reachable from τ(u) in TG(τ(u), L(τ(u)), τ([u−1])). Clearly, each agent
in S is unlabelled. Actually, notice that any agent in S is frozen. Therefore, any path
through i after u-th iteration will reach an unlabelled agent.
The following two properties (dominance and monotonicity) are well known for agents
with strict preference orderings. We generalise them to agents with indifferences. The
difficulty of proving both dominance and monotonicity lemmas (Lemma 5.4 and 5.6) lies
in case 4. (in the definition of threshold θ). This is our main technical contribution as
compared to the analysis in [16].
Recall that τ (σ, resp.) is the order of agents under the execution of ALG (ALG−i,
resp.). We first discuss intuitions behind case 4. in the context of the Dominance Lemma
(Lemma 5.4). Note that in this case there is a path from i′ to i′′ in TG(i′, Ci′j \{a}, [n1]\{i})
and agent i′′ is unlabelled. We will prove the Dominance Lemma by contradiction, using
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the following two main steps. Indeed, let us assume towards a contradiction, see the text
of Lemma 5.4, that Yi < θ and i is not matched in ALG. Then the outcome of ALG is
the same as that of ALG−i for all the other agents (except agent i). Suppose σ(u) = i′′ in
ALG−i, then τ(u+1) = i′′ in ALG under case 4. Based on the fact that outcomes of ALG
and ALG−i are the same (for all agents except agent i), first, we prove that either i′ is
labelled or there is a path, let us call it P1, from i
′ to a labelled agent in TG(i′, Ci′j , τ([u]))
at the end of the u-th iteration of the “for loop” in ALG. Secondly, due to the above
property, we argue that there is a path, let us call it P2, from i to a labelled agent in
TG(i, a, τ([u])) at the end of the u-th iteration of the “for loop” in ALG, contradicting
Observation 5.3; thus i will be matched. Path P2 is constructed by the concatenation of
arc (i, i′) and path P1, or the concatenation of arc (i, i′′′), for some i′′′ on path P1, and
the rest of path P1. The existence of P1 is proved by a careful analysis of the structure of
frozen subgraphs of the trading graph as the algorithm proceeds; the details can be found
in the proof of Lemma 5.4.
Lemma 5.4 (Dominance Lemma). Given Y−i, i gets matched (to some object) if Yi < θ.
Proof. Let us assume towards a contradiction that Yi < θ and i is not matched in ALG.
We will consider the following cases below.
Case 1. (Corresponding to case 1 in the definition of threshold θ.) If a is unmatched in
ALG−i, then θ = 1. Suppose agent i is unmatched in ALG, then procedure ALG is the
same as ALG−i for all the other agents except i. But then a is always available to agent
i, meaning a will be matched to agent i by process of SDMT-2, contradiction.
Case 2. If a is matched to i′ in ALG−i:
Case 2-(i). (Corresponding to cases 2 and 3 in the definition of threshold θ.) If i′ is
labelled or if there is a path from i′ to a labelled agent in TG(i′, Ci′j \{a}, [n1]\{i}), and
i is unmatched, then there is a path from i to a labelled agent in TG(i, a, [n1]). In this
case, by Trading(i, a, [n1]), we obtain a Pareto improvement, contradicting that SDMT-2
is Pareto optimal.
Case 2-(ii). (Corresponding to cases 5 and 4 in the definition of threshold θ.) The case
θ = 0 is trivial, so we consider that wi(1− g(y)) = wi′′(1− g(Yi′′)) has a solution. Suppose
that σ(u) = i′′ in ALG−i, then if Yi < θ, we know that wi(1 − g(Yi)) > wi′′(1 − g(Yi′′)),
meaning the agent i is prior to agent i′′ in ALG. Then τ(u + 1) = i′′ in ALG. If i is
unmatched in ALG, then procedure ALG is the same as ALG−i for all the other agents
except i.
Suppose i′′ is allocated an object b in ALG. If i′′ = i′, then b = a, and if in addition
a ∈ Ou+1, this means a is always available to all the agents prior to τ(u + 1) = i′′ = i′.
Therefore, a will be available to i when i initially selects objects, implying that i must be
allocated to some object in his turn, leading to a contradiction.
The case a /∈ Ou+1 is analyzed similarly to the case i′′ 6= i′, so we consider that
i′′ 6= i′. Since there is a path from i′ to i′′ after the “for loop” in ALG terminates, i is
still unmatched because of our assumption towards a contradiction. Suppose that in this
path τ(k) points to τ(u+ 1) = i′′, for some k ≤ u, then b is available to τ(k) or b has been
allocated before the k-th iteration of the “for loop” in ALG. Since finally τ(k) gets an
object in the same indifference class as b by Observation 4.1, before the (u+1)-st iteration
of the “for loop” in ALG, b has been allocated by Observation 4.2. Hence, in the (u+1)-st
iteration of the “for loop” in ALG, τ(u+ 1) gets object b through the trading graph.
Observation 5.5. The trading graph TG(i′, Ci′j \{a}, [n1]) after the “for loop” in ALG
terminates, is exactly the same as TG(i′, Ci′j \{a}, τ([u + 1])) at the end of the (u + 1)-st
iteration.
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This observation follows from the fact that otherwise, some agent τ(`) may be reachable
from i′, where ` > u + 1, by process of SDMT-2, contradicting the definition of i′′; note
that we used here the largest index tie breaking rule.
Therefore, at the end of the u-th iteration of the “for loop” of ALG, suppose that B is
the set of objects allocated to i′. Then we have the following three cases (note that ALG
is the same as ALG−i for all the other agents except i):
Case 2-(ii)-1. i′ is labelled, then a ∈ B. Otherwise, if a 6∈ B, then in the (u+ 1)-st
“for loop” iteration of ALG, a will not be allocated to i′ at the end of this (u+ 1)-
st iteration by the process of SDMT-2. Thus a ∈ B, and since the trading graph
TG(i′, Ci′j \{a}, [n1]) after the “for loop” in ALG terminates is exactly the same as
TG(i′, Ci′j \{a}, τ([u+ 1])) at the end of the (u+ 1)-st iteration, it follows that i′ will
not be matched to a at the end of the “for loop” of ALG, contradiction.
Case 2-(ii)-2. i′ is unlabelled and B = {a}. Then there is a path from i′ to a
labelled agent in TG(i′, Ci′j \{a}, τ([u])). Otherwise, all the agents reachable from
i′ are frozen after the u-th iteration of the “for loop”. This means that the allo-
cations of those agents are fixed, because all the objects in their indifference class
have been allocated by Observation 4.2. Thus, TG(i′, Ci′j \{a}, τ([u])) should be the
same as TG(i′, Ci′j \{a}, τ([u + 1])). However, since τ(u + 1) is reachable from i′ in
TG(i′, Ci′j \{a}, τ([u+ 1])), while τ(u+ 1) does not appear in TG(i′, Ci
′
j \{a}, τ([u])),
we reach a contradiction.
Case 2-(ii)-3. i′ is unlabelled and B = {c}, where c 6= a. Then there is a path from
i′ to a labelled agent in TG(i′, {a}, τ([u])). Otherwise, a and the agent matched to
a is frozen at the end of the u-th “for loop” iteration in ALG. This means that a
will not be matched to i′ at the end of the “for loop” of ALG, contradiction.
As a result, in either of the above three cases, there is a path from i to a labelled agent
in TG(i, a, τ([u])) at the end of the u-th “for loop” iteration in ALG. Namely, for case 2-
(ii)-1, i points to i′, which is labelled in TG(i, a, τ([u])); for case 2-(ii)-2, i points to i′ in
TG(i, a, τ([u])) and there is a path from i′ to a labelled agent in TG(i′, Ci′j \{a}, τ([u])) ⊆
TG(i, a, τ([u])). Finally, for case 2-(ii)-3, suppose a is assigned to i′′′ at the end of the
u-th “for loop” iteration, then there is a path from i′′′ to a labelled agent in TG(i, a, τ([u]))
and i points to i′′′ in TG(i, a, τ([u])). This contradicts Observation 5.3. Hence, i must be
matched to some object.
Let βsa = βa((s, Y−i)), when ALG denotes the execution of Algorithm 3 on the original
instance and Y−i is fixed and Yi = s. Note that βθa = wi(1 − g(θ))/F . This last equality
is easy to check in cases 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the definition of threshold θ. In case 4, we
note that wi(1 − g(θ)) = wi′′(1 − g(Yi′′)) for some agent i′′ 6= i. And because βθa is the
value of the dual variable for object a when ALG is run with Yi = θ, case 4 means that
βθa = wi(1 − g(θ))/F , despite the fact that object a might not necessarily be assigned to
agent i (however, agent i will be assigned some object).
We will now turn our attention to proving the monotonicity lemma.
Lemma 5.6 (Monotonicity Lemma). Given Y−i, for all choices of Yi, βYia ≥ βθa.
Before presenting the full formal proof, we will first sketch the main ideas behind the
proof. The difficulty of the proof of the monotonicity lemma still lies in case 4 from the
definition of threshold θ. We prove it in three steps. Recall that τ (σ, respectively) is
the order of agents under the execution of ALG (ALG−i, respectively). Let σ(u) = i′′
in ALG−i. Observe that the monotonicity lemma means that a is allocated to an agent
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prior to i′′ or to i′′. The proof of this is easy in the case where Yi > θ. To see this, note
that ALG and ALG−i result in the same tentative allocation at the end of their u-th loop,
since i is inserted back after i′′. Hence, we only need to consider the case where Yi < θ,
which implies that i is inserted back prior to i′′.
• Firstly, we prove in Claim 5.7 below, that no agent, except i, is allocated a better
object in ALG compared to ALG−i. The argument is by contradiction: suppose
there exists an agent i′′′ who receives a better object in ALG than in ALG−i, then
i must be inserted before i′′′. Consequently, there exists an agent s prior to i′′′ who
will get a worse object in ALG than in ALG−i. Based on this fact, and using an
alternating path argument, it is proved that there exists a path from s to i′′′ in s’s
trading graph constructed from a higher indifference class of s (than s’s allocated
indifference class in ALG) after i′′′ is allocated in ALG. This contradicts the fact
that this path should not exist since the graph from that higher indifference class is
frozen.
• Secondly, we prove in Claim 5.8 below, that if i′ gets a worse object in ALG compared
to ALG−i, we prove that a must be allocated to an agent prior to i′, which is in turn
prior to i′′. The reason is as follows: by Observation 4.2, a must be allocated and
frozen before i′ is considered in ALG. Then, if i′ gets an object in ALG in the same
indifference class as a, then we prove that there exists an agent s∗ prior to i′′, and
suppose τ(u∗) = s∗, such that there is a path from s∗ to i′ in TG(s∗, Cs∗j∗ , τ([u
∗]))
at the end of the u∗-th “for loop” iteration of ALG. Here, Cs∗j∗ is the indifference
class in which s∗ is allocated an object in ALG−i. As a consequence, by Observation
4.2, a is allocated to an agent prior to s∗ and all the agents reachable from s∗ in
TG(s∗, Cs∗j∗ , τ([u
∗])) are frozen, then a will finally be allocated to an agent prior to
s∗ in ALG. This means that a is allocated to an agent prior to i′′.
This reasoning gives the monotonicity lemma, which together with dominance lemma is
used to prove Lemma 5.9.
Proof. (full proof of the Monotonicity Lemma, Lemma 5.6)
Case 1. (Corresponding to case 1 in the definition of threshold θ.) If a is unmatched
in ALG−i, or if a is matched to i′ in ALG−i and i′ is labelled, or a is matched to i′ in
ALG−i and there is a path from i′ to a labelled agent in TG(i′, Ci
′
j \{a}, [n1]), then θ = 1
and βθa = wi(1− g(θ))/F = 0, so βYia ≥ βθa = 0.
Case 2. (Corresponding to cases 2 and 3 in the definition of threshold θ.) If a is matched
to i′ in ALG−i, there is no path from i′ to a labelled agent in TG(i′, Ci
′
j \{a}, [n1]\{i}).
Suppose σ(u) = i′′ in ALG−i. Notice that τ([u + 1]) = σ([u]). Then by Observation
5.5, the trading graph TG(i′, Ci′j \{a}, σ([u])) at the end of the u-th “for loop” iteration
is the same as TG(i′, Ci′j \{a}, [n1]\{i}) at the termination of the “for loop” in ALG−i.
Otherwise, the TG(i′, Ci′j \{a}, σ([u])) is not frozen after the u-th “for loop” iteration of
ALG−i, meaning that there is a path from i′ to a labelled agent in TG(i′, Ci
′
j \{a}, σ([u])).
Therefore, either i′ will reach an agent inferior to i′′ or a labelled agent in TG(i′, Ci′j \{a},
[n1]\{i}) by SDMT-2. This contradicts the definition of i′′.
Case 3. (Corresponding to case 5 in the definition of threshold θ.) Suppose that equation
wi(1 − g(y)) = wi′′(1 − g(Yi′′)) does not have a solution, which means that θ = 0 and
wi(1 − g(Yi))/F < wi′′(1 − g(Yi′′))/F , for any Yi ∈ [0, 1]. This shows that the process is
the same for agents prior to agent i′′ until the end of the u-th “for loop” iteration in ALG
and ALG−i. Since there is no path from i′ to a labelled agent in TG(i′, Ci
′
j \{a}, σ([u])),
the agents reachable from i′ are frozen. Hence, a will be finally still allocated to i′ in ALG,
implying βYia = wi′(1− g(Yi′))/F ≥ wi′′(1− g(Yi′′))/F > βθa = wi(1− g(0))/F .
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Case 4. (Corresponding to case 4 in the definition of threshold θ.) Now consider the last
case that equation wi(1−g(y)) = wi′′(1−g(Yi′′)) has a solution, then βθa = wi(1−g(θ))/F =
wi′′(1− g(Yi′′))/F . Consider the following three cases:
Case (4-i): If Yi > θ, this means wi(1−g(Yi))/F < wi′′(1−g(Yi′′))/F , and the analysis of
this case is the same as above (the case that equation wi(1−g(y)) = wi′′(1−g(Yi′′)) does not
have a solution), since i will select objects after i′′. Thus, we have βYia = wi′(1−g(Yi′))/F ≥
βθa.
Case (4-ii): If Yi < θ, then wi(1− g(Yi))/F > wi′′(1− g(Yi′′))/F , which means that i is
prior to i′′ in ALG. We have the following claim:
Claim 5.7. No agent can get a better object in ALG than in ALG−i after inserting i into
some position from 1 to u.
Proof. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that there exists an agent getting a better object,
and let k be the smallest position where such agents are placed in ALG. Then i must be
inserted in a position before k (otherwise, the process is the same for the first k agents
in ALG−i and ALG, so agent τ(k) can not get a better object). Let i′′′ = τ(k) and
suppose that i′′′ gets an object b in ALG and object c in ALG−i, where b i′′′ c. Observe
that σ(k − 1) = i′′′ in ALG−i. Suppose that b ∈ Ci′′′j and consider the trading graph
TG(i′′′, Ci′′′j , σ([k − 1])) at the end of the (k − 1)-st “for loop” iteration of ALG−i.
Let S be the set of agents reachable from i′′′ in TG(i′′′, Ci′′′j , σ([k − 1])) at the end of
the (k− 1)-st “for loop” iteration of ALG−i. Note that any agent in S is prior to i′′′. Any
agent in S is allocated only one object and frozen in ALG−i. Since in ALG, b is allocated
to i′′′, then in the k-th “for loop” iteration of ALG, i′′′ will be allocated some objects in
Ci
′′′
j . This means that some agent in S will get worse object compared to the allocation
in ALG−i.
The reason is as follows: no agent can get a better object by the definition of k. If all
the agents in S can remain the same in ALG compared with ALG−i (i.e., get the objects
in the same indifference class in ALG and in ALG−i), then the only possible allocation
of S in ALG is reallocating all the objects matched to S in ALG−i to S again such that
each agent gets exactly one object. If there is some extra object e in ALG allocated to
an agent from S in ALG, then e must be allocated to some agent j in ALG−i. Since e
in ALG is allocated to some agent in S, thus, j can be reached by some agent in S in
ALG−i. Thus, j ∈ S, which leads to a contradiction. All the objects in Ci′′′j have been
allocated to some agents in S. In ALG, we will need to allocate |S| objects to S ∪ {i′′′}
agents because some objects owned by S in ALG−i will be allocated to agent i′′′. This is
not possible, which gives a contradiction.
Let s be an agent in S who gets a worse object and there is a path from s to i′′′ in the
trading graph TG(s, d, τ [k]) at the end of the k-th “for loop” iteration in ALG, where d
is the allocated object of s in ALG−i. (Such an agent must exist: it can be found by the
following procedure. Suppose d1 's1 b owned by s1 in ALG−i is allocated to i′′′ in ALG
at the end of the k-th “for loop” iteration in ALG. If s1 gets worse in ALG compared
to ALG−i, then s1 is the agent we are looking for. Otherwise, s1 will be allocated object
d2 owned by s2 ∈ S in ALG−i at the end of the k-th “for loop” iteration of ALG. If s2
gets a worse object, then s2 is the agent we are looking for. Otherwise, we continue with
this procedure. By finiteness of the set S and by the fact that the agents in S own |S|
objects in ALG−i, these objects will be allocated to agents in S ∪ {i′′′} in ALG, and one
of these objects will be allocated to i′′′. Thus, we can find such an agent. The path from
s to i′′′ in the trading graph TG(s, d, τ [k]) at the end of the k-th “for loop” iteration in
ALG is just the reverse path by the above procedure). Suppose τ(`) = s in ALG and
d ∈ Csh. Consider the `-th “for loop” iteration in ALG: all the agents reachable from s in
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TG(s, Csh, σ([`])) are frozen and prior to agent s since s does not obtain any object in the
indifference class Csh.
This contradicts the fact that there is a path from s to i′′′ (which is inferior to s) in
the trading graph TG(s, d, τ [k]) at the end of the k-th “for loop” iteration in ALG.
Claim 5.8. Object a must be allocated to an agent prior to i′′ or to i′′, that is, we must
have βYia ≥ wi′′(1− g(Yi′′)) = βθa.
Proof. Suppose σ(u1) = i
′ and σ(u) = i′′ in ALG−i. The following cases are considered:
Case (1). If i′ gets worse, meaning he gets a worse object in ALG than a in ALG−i,
then τ(u1 + 1) = i
′ in ALG (i is inserted back prior to i′). Thus, all the agents reachable
from i′ in TG(i′, a, τ([u1 +1])) are frozen and the agent who owns a will finally get a. This
agent is prior to i′, giving that βYia ≥ wi′(1− g(Yi′)) ≥ wi′′(1− g(Yi′′)) = βθa.
Case (2). If i′ gets a in ALG, then we are done. Otherwise, suppose i′ gets an
object a′ 'i′ a, a′, a ∈ Ci′j in ALG. Denote by S∗ the set of agents reachable from i′ in
TG(i′, Ci′j \{a}, σ([n1−1])) at the end of the “for loop” of ALG−i (note that σ([n1−1]) =
[n1]\{i}). If no one in S∗ gets worse in ALG than in ALG−i, then a must be allocated
to some agent in S∗. The reason is similar to the above argument. All agents in S∗ get
exactly one object. If a is not allocated in S∗, no one gets worse in S∗, and there must
be an extra object b allocated to some agent j in S∗. No matter whom b is allocated
to in ALG−i, there is a path from j to this agent. Hence, this agent belongs to S∗, a
contradiction. Note that, by the definition of i′′, for any s ∈ S∗, σ−1(s) > σ−1(i′′) (σ−1(s)
denotes the order of s in σ or in ALG−i) implies that ws(1 − g(Ys)) ≥ wi′′(1 − g(Yi′′)).
Therefore βYia ≥ wi′′(1− g(Yi′′)) = βθa.
Otherwise, by the previous argument, there exists s∗ ∈ S∗ who gets worse in ALG
compared to ALG−i, and there is a path from s∗ ∈ S∗ to i′ in TG(s∗, d∗, [n1]) at the end
of ALG, where d∗ is the allocation of s∗ in ALG−i. If s∗ is prior to i′, then by similar
argument as above, there should be no path from s∗ to an agent inferior to s∗ (constructed
from the objects in L(s∗) no worse than d∗) at the end of ALG, a contradiction. Hence,
s∗ can only be inferior to i′. Suppose τ(u∗) = s∗ and d∗ ∈ Cs∗j∗ , then we know that there
is a path from s∗ to i′ in TG(s∗, Cs∗j∗ , [n1]) at the end of the “for loop” of ALG. Next we
will prove the following statement (which we denote as (∗)):
There is a path from s∗ to i′ inTG(s∗, Cs
∗
j∗ , τ([u
∗])) at the end ofu∗-th “for loop” ofALG.
If (∗) is true, then all the agents reachable from s∗ in TG(s∗, Cs∗j∗ , τ([u∗])) are frozen,
and a is allocated to an agent prior to s∗ due to Observation 4.2. Then, we have that
βYia ≥ ws∗(1− g(Ys∗)) ≥ wi′′(1− g(Yi′′)) = βθa since s∗ ∈ S∗.
Suppose finally that (∗) is not true, then all the agents U∗ that are reachable from s∗ in
TG(s∗, d∗, τ([u∗])) have been frozen. U∗ will remain the same until the end of ALG and
i′ /∈ U∗. However, by the definition of S∗ and by s∗ ∈ S∗, there is a path from s∗ to i′ in
TG(s∗, d∗, [n1]) at the end of ALG, meaning i′ ∈ U∗, a contradiction.
By Claim 5.8, we know that if Yi < θ then β
Yi
a ≥ wi′′(1− g(Yi′′))/F = βθa.
Case (4-iii): If Yi = θ, this means that wi(1 − g(Yi))/F = wi′′(1 − g(Yi′′))/F . If i′′ < i,
the case is same as if Yi > θ. Otherwise, it falls into the case Yi < θ.
To summarise, for all choices of Yi, β
Yi
a ≥ βθa.
Let us recall that F = (1 − 1e ) and g(y) = ey−1. Observe that
∫
g(y)dy = g(y) + C,
where C is any fixed constant. Then it is not difficult to see that
for each t ∈ [0, 1] :
∫ t
0
g(y)dy + 1− g(t) = F (1)
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Lemma 5.9 ([16]). ∀(i, a) ∈ E, E~Y (αi(~Y ) + βa(~Y )) ≥ wi.
Proof. For fixed choices of Y−i, by the Dominance Lemma (Lemma 5.4), i is matched
whenever Yi < θ. Hence,
EYi(αi(~Y )) ≥ wi
∫ θ
0
g(y)dy/F.
By the Monotonicity Lemma (Lemma 5.6), βa(~Y ) = β
Yi
a ≥ βθa = wi(1 − g(θ))/F , for any
Yi ∈ [0, 1], then
EYi(βa(~Y )) ≥ wi(1− g(θ))/F.
Therefore, note that by formula (1), we have
EYi(αi(~Y ) + βa(~Y )) ≥ wi
∫ θ
0
g(y)dy/F + wi(1− g(θ))/F = wi.
As a result, E~Y (αi(~Y ) + βa(~Y )) ≥ wi.
From Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5.9, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5.10. Algorithm 3 achieves an approximation ratio of ee−1 for weighted agents
with indifferences.
6 Online interpretation and lower bounds
We will first provide here an “online” flavour interpretation of the weighted version of our
problem. We interpret it in the following way. An administrator holds all the objects,
and all agents with unknown preference lists are applicants for these objects. We assume
that weights are private information of each agent, but that they cannot overstate their
weights, a so-called no-overbidding assumption. Applicants are interviewed one-by-one
in a random order. A decision about each particular applicant is to be made immedi-
ately after the interview. During the interview, the applicant selects his favourite object
among the available remaining objects if there exists one in his preference list and must
be allocated (matched to) that object because we consider only truthful mechanisms.7
This applicant will not be interviewed again. The administrator can know the number of
matched applicants interviewed so far, but is unaware whether yet unseen applicants will
be matched or not. Our goal is to find the optimal strategy, that is a (random) arrival
order of agents that maximises the ratio between the total weight of matched agents and
the maximum weight of a matching if all the agents preference lists are known in advance.
We will now describe the required preliminaries that will be used in the remainder of
this section to prove the lower bounds.
Preliminaries. We will use Yao’s minmax principle, see [25, Proposition 2.5 (page 35)]
and [37], to obtain a non-trivial lower bound for universally truthful and Pareto optimal
7We can extend this setting to the case where the administrator can decide whether to let the applicant
select his favourite object or to reject this applicant, meaning that the applicant gets nothing. In this more
general problem, it is not difficult to prove that for any fixed order of the applicants, the decision that the
administrator does not reject any applicant will maximise the number of matched applicants. Therefore,
this more general problem is reduced to the setting where the administrator lets each applicant select his
favourite object, and hence our lower bound from Section 6 also applies to this setting.
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mechanisms and another lower bound for an “online” version of our problem. We first
need some preliminaries.
Let us fix the number of agents n1 and the number of objects n2. The number of distinct
instances and the number of deterministic truthful and Pareto optimal mechanisms are
finite. Denote by T the set of deterministic truthful and Pareto optimal mechanisms
with input size n1 and n2, and I the set of instances with input size n1 and n2. Let
P and Q denote the set of probability distributions on T and I, respectively. Denote
Ep,q(r(Tp, Iq)) as the inverse of approximation ratio when the input Iq is sampled according
to the distribution q ∈ Q and a universally truthful and Pareto optimal mechanism Tp is
sampled according to the distribution p ∈ P. Then the minmax theorem [37] states the
following:
min
q∈Q
max
p∈P
Ep,q(r(Tp, Iq)) = max
p∈P
min
q∈Q
Ep,q(r(Tp, Iq))
and
min
q∈Q
max
T∈T
Eq(r(T, Iq)) = max
p∈P
min
I∈I
Ep(r(Tp, I)).
As a consequence, for any q ∈ Q and p ∈ P, we have
max
T∈T
Eq(r(T, Iq)) ≥ min
I∈I
Ep(r(Tp, I)).
This inequality states that an upper bound on the inverse of the approximation ratio
of the best universally truthful and Pareto optimal mechanism Tp on the worst instance
is upper bounded by the inverse of the approximation ratio of the best deterministic
truthful and Pareto optimal mechanism on a randomly chosen instance. Hence, in order to
bound minI∈I Ep(r(Tp, I)), we only need to construct an appropriate random instance and
compute the upper bound of the best deterministic truthful and Pareto optimal mechanism
on this random instance. Consider the triangle instance where N = {1, 2, · · · , n1} and
O = {o1, o2, · · · , on1}, and an agent i’s preference ordering is o1 i o2 i · · · i oi, for any
i ∈ N .
Let S denote the set of all the permutations of agents’ preference lists of the triangle
instance. Consider now a random instance Suni as the uniform distribution of S. It is obvi-
ous that the output of any serial dictatorship mechanism (which is a deterministic, truthful
and Pareto optimal mechanism, defined by a specific fixed order of the agents) running on
S is the same. Hence, for any serial dictatorship mechanism (SDM), Euni(r(SDM,Suni))
is equal to the inverse of the approximation ratio of RSDM, which is just SDM with the
order of agents chosen uniformly at random, when running on the triangle instance.
Online lower bound. We now apply these preliminaries to the online version of our
problem. Recall that applicants in this online problem are truthful due to the truthfulness
of serial dictatorship mechanism. The strategy of the administrator is a random order
in which the applicants are interviewed. More precisely, let Π denote the set of all the
permutations of applicants and P (Π) be the set of probability distributions on Π. Let Πp
be a random order of applicants, where the order is selected according to the distribution
p ∈ P (Π) on Π, and then the strategy set of the administrator is {Πp : p ∈ P (Π)}. We will
show that the best strategy for the administrator is to select applicants’ order uniformly
at random.
Theorem 6.1. The best strategy for the administrator in the online problem is to select
the applicants’ order uniformly at random. Thus, any other randomised strategy, than the
one used in Algorithm 3, would lead to an approximation guarantee worse than ee−1 .
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Proof. This proof is similar to the classical proof from [22]. In particular it uses the same
class of instances. Let Ep,q(r(Πp, Iq)) be the inverse of the approximation ratio when the
random order is Πp and the random instance is Iq, and let Πuni denote the uniform order.
By the approximation ratio of RSDM, for any I, Euni(r(Πuni, I)) ≥ e−1e . Now for upper
bound of Ep,q(r(Πp, Iq)), by Yao’s principle [25, Proposition 2.5], maxT∈Π Eq(r(T, Iq)) ≥
minI∈I Ep(r(Tp, I)). Recall that Suni is the uniform distribution over S. Then we need
to upper bound maxT∈Π Eq(r(T, Suni)), which in fact is equal to the inverse of the ap-
proximation ratio obtained by running RSDM on the triangle instance, which is e−1e . The
argument is as follows. Suppose object ok is allocated by RSDM with probability pk ≤ 1
on the triangle instance. Then, because there are n1−k+ 1 agents with ok in their prefer-
ence lists, each such agent obtains ok with equal probability
pk
n1−k+1 . Therefore, agent i is
allocated an object with probability
∑i
j=1
pj
n1−j+1 , which is at most min{1,
∑i
j=1
1
n1−j+1}.
Now, summing over all the agents, by a simple calculation we get that the expected cardi-
nality of the number of allocated agents is at most n1(1− 1e ), for large enough n1. Hence,
the approximation ratio is tight.
Lower bound for randomised mechanisms. If we can prove that the output of any
deterministic truthful and Pareto optimal mechanism running on S is the same as that
of SDM then maxT∈T Eq(r(T, I)) = 1 − 1e . To show our lower bound it suffices to show
that the sum of the sizes of all the matchings returned by any deterministic truthful and
Pareto optimal mechanism executed on S is smaller than that of returned by any SDM
executed on S. Then maxT∈T Eq(r(T, I)) = 1 − 1e . We use #φ(S) to denote the sum of
the sizes of all the matchings returned by mechanism φ when executed on S. We want to
to prove that #φ(S) ≤ #SDM (S), for any n1 and n2 and for any universally truthful and
Pareto optimal mechanism φ. We can prove this inequality assuming n1 = n2 = 3, which
gives us the lower bound of 1813 for any universally truthful and Pareto optimal mechanism.
Theorem 6.2. For any deterministic truthful and Pareto optimal mechanism φ, #φ(S) ≤
13, when n1 = 3. Thus, any universally truthful and Pareto optimal mechanism for this
problem has an approximation ratio of at least 1813 .
Proof. Suppose the agents are 1, 2, 3 and objects are a, b, c. We use the notation a b ca b
a b c
 to denote assignments that allocate a to agent 1, b to agent 2 and c to agent
3, where row i denotes agent i’s preference list and preference ordering is the increasing
order of column indices, i = 1, 2, 3. If there are no underlines of the objects, then this
notation denotes the input of mechanism. Note that in this setting, S =

 aa b
a b c
 , aa b c
a b
,
 a ba
a b c
,
 a ba b c
a
,
 a b ca
a b
,
 a b ca b
a
. We would
like to show that for any deterministic truthful and Pareto optimal mechanism φ, #φ(S) ≤
13. Without loss of generality, suppose
 a b ca b c
a b c
, and we will consider the following
two cases:
Case (i): If
 a b ca b
a b c
, then we will show that
 a ba b c
a b c
. (Observe that the
first agent must get a because otherwise we have contradiction with truthfulness by
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 a b ca b c
a b c
.)
Now, if
 a ba b c
a b c
 would not hold then
 a ba b c
a b c
. Then we obtain
 a ba b
a b c
.
The reason is as follows:
 a b ca b
a b c
 implies that the first agent in the input
 a ba b
a b c

cannot get any object by truthfulness. Similarly, from
 a ba b c
a b c
, the second agent in a ba b
a b c
 cannot get any object by truthfulness. Thus we have that
 a ba b
a b c
,
which is a contradiction to Pareto optimality.
By a similar argument, we have
 a ba b
a b c
,
 aa b c
a b c
 and
 aa b
a b c
. From a ba b
a b c
, we know the size of the matching output from
 a ba
a b c
 is 2. From a b ca b
a b c
, we know the size of the matching output from
 a b ca
a b
 is 2. From a ba b c
a b c
, we know the size of the matching output from
 a ba b c
a
 is 2. From aa b c
a b c
, we know the size of the matching output from
 aa b c
a b
 is at most 2.
Thus, if the current mechanism is φ1 then #φ
1
(S) ≤ 13.
Case (ii): If
 a b ca b
a b c
, we consider the following two cases:
Case (ii-a): If
 a ba b c
a b c
, then
 a ba b
a b c
, and we conclude that
 a b ca b c
a b
,
otherwise suppose
 a b ca b c
a b
 (since
 a b ca b c
a b c
), then b is allocated to agent 1 in a ba b c
a b
. From
 a ba b c
a b c
, we know b is allocated to agent 3 in
 a ba b c
a b
,
a contradiction. Hence,
 a b ca b c
a b
, then we know
 a b ca b
a b
 (from
 a b ca b c
a b

and
 a b ca b
a b c
 ), and
 a ba b c
a b
 (From
 a b ca b c
a b
 and
 a ba b c
a b c
). Now the
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matching size of assignment of
 a b ca
a b
 and
 a b ca b
a
 is both 2 (from
 a b ca b
a b
).
The matching size of assignment of
 a ba b c
a
 is 2 since
 a ba b c
a b
. The matching
size of assignment of
 a ba
a b c
 is 2 following from
 a ba b
a b c
. Consider the assign-
ment of
 aa b c
a b c
, no matter what the assignment is, at most one matching size of
assignment of
 aa b
a b c
 and
 aa b c
a b
 is 3. Denote the mechanism in this case by
φ2, then #
φ2(S) ≤ 13.
Case (ii-b): If
 a ba b c
a b c
, recall that
 a b ca b
a b c
 and
 a b ca b c
a b c
, consider the
following two cases:
Case (ii-b-1): If
 a b ca b c
a b
, then
 a b ca b
a b
 since
 a b ca b
a b c
. We know the
matching sizes of assignment of
 a b ca b
a
 and
 a b ca
a b
 are both 2. Since
 a ba b
a b c

due to
 a b ca b
a b c
 and
 a b ca b c
a b
, the matching size of assignment of
 a ba
a b c

is 2. Since
 a ba b c
a b
 due to
 a b ca b c
a b
 and
 a ba b c
a b c
, then the matching size
of assignment of
 a ba b c
a
 is 2. Similar as the above argument, consider the assign-
ment of
 aa b c
a b c
, no matter what the assignment is, at most one matching size of
assignment of
 aa b
a b c
 and
 aa b c
a b
 is 3. Denote the mechanism in this case by
φ3, then #
φ3(S) ≤ 13.
Case (ii-b-2): If
 a b ca b c
a b
, recall that we have
 a ba b c
a b c
,
 a b ca b
a b c
 and a b ca b c
a b c
. From
 a b ca b c
a b
 and
 a ba b c
a b c
, we get
 a ba b c
a b
, then the
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matching sizes of assignment of
 aa b c
a b
 and
 a ba b c
a
 are both 2. From
 a b ca b
a b c

and
 a ba b c
a b c
, we get
 a ba b
a b c
, then the matching size of assignment of
 a ba
a b c

is 2. From
 a b ca b
a b c
 and
 a b ca b c
a b
, we get
 a b ca b
a b
, then the matching size
of assignment of
 a b ca b
a
 is 2. From
 a b ca b
a b
 and
 a ba b
a b c
, it follows that a ba b
a b
, we conclude
 aa b
a b c
 is not true. Otherwise from
 aa b
a b c
 and a ba b
a b
, it follows that
 aa b
a b
, which contradicts to the Pareto optimality of
the mechanism. Hence, the matching size of assignment of
 aa b
a b c
 is 2. It is obvi-
ous to see that the matching size of assignment of
 a b ca
a b
 is at most 3. Denote the
current mechanism as φ4, we know that #φ
4
(S) ≤ 13.
Note that Theorem 6.2 shows that minI∈I Ep(r(Tp, I)) ≤ maxT∈T Eq(r(T, Suni)) ≤ 1318 ,
for any p ∈ P, and when Suni is the uniform distribution over S. Hence, the approximation
ratio is at least 1813 .
Lower bound for non-bossy mechanisms. In this subsection we only consider the
unweighted HA problem and with strict preferences. Thus an instance of HA is just
I = (N,O,L), where L = (L(1), . . . , L(n1)) is the joint list of (strict) preferences of the
agents.
We first define the concept of non-bossiness for a deterministic mechanism (see, e.g.,
[26]). A deterministic mechanism φ is non-bossy if for any agent i ∈ N , any joint preference
list profile L, and any preference list L′(i) of agent i, if φi(L(i), L(−i)) = φi(L′(i), L(−i))
then φ(L(i), L(−i)) = φ(L′(i), L(−i)). Roughly speaking, non-bossiness ensures that no
agent can change the allocation of other agents, by reporting a different preference list,
without changing his own allocation.
Bade [7] showed that (Theorem 1 in [7]) any mechanism that is truthful, Pareto optimal
and non-bossy is s-equivalent to SDM, in the sense that if the order of agents is generated
uniformly at random, the matching returned by SDM is the same as the one returned by
any truthful, Pareto optimal and non-bossy mechanism.
We will now briefly introduce the required notions from [7] to be able to formally use
the result of Bade [7]. Let φ : I →M be any deterministic mechanism for HA and σ be any
order (permutation) of the agents. We define a permuted mechanism σ  φ : I → M via
(σφ)i(L) = φσ−1(i)(L(σ(1)), . . . , L(σ(n1))) for any agent i ∈ N . Intuitively, permutation
σ assigns each agent in N to a role in the mechanism, such that the agent σ(i) under σφ
assumes the role that agent i plays under φ.
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The symmetrization of a deterministic mechanism φ : I →M is a random mechanism
Rand(φ) : I → Rand(M) that calculates the probability of matching µ at the joint
preferences list L as the probability of a permutation σ with µ = (σ  φ)(L) under the
uniform distribution on Π(N), i.e., where σ ∈ Π(N) is a uniform random permutation of
the agents, and Π(N) is the set of all permutations of the agents. So we have:
Pr [Rand(φ)(L) = µ] =
|{σ : (σ  φ)(L) = µ}|
n1!
.
For instance a symmetrization of SDM is simply RSDM.
We say that two deterministic mechanisms φ and φ′ are s-equivalent if Rand(φ) =
Rand(φ′). The main result of Bade [7] can now be stated as.
Theorem 6.3 (Theorem 1 in [7]). Any (deterministic) truthful, Pareto optimal and non-
bossy mechanism for HA is s-equivalent to serial dictatorship mechanism (SDM).
Using this theorem we can now prove the following tight lower bound.
Theorem 6.4. No random mechanism which is a symmetrization of any truthful, non-
bossy and Pareto optimal mechanism can achieve the approximation ratio better than ee−1 .
Proof. Let φ be any deterministic truthful, non-bossy and Pareto optimal mechanism for
the HA problem with strict preferences. By Theorem 6.3 the random mechanism Rand(φ)
is equivalent to RSDM. In the proof of Theorem 6.1, we have shown that the expected
aproximation ratio of RSDM cannot be better than ee−1 on the triangle instances of HA
for large enough n1. This concludes the argument.
Note that our mechanism with strict preference lists and weights is a symmetrization
of a truthful, non-bossy and Pareto optimal mechanism SDMT-2.
7 Conclusion
Whilst this paper has focused on Pareto optimality in the HA context, stronger forms of
optimality are possible. For example, minimum cost (or maximum utility), rank-maximal
and popular matchings can also be studied in the HA context, and a matching of each of
these types is Pareto optimal (see, e.g., [24, Sec. 1.5] for definitions). As Pareto optimality
is a unifying feature of all of these other forms of optimality, we chose to concentrate
on this concept in our search for randomised truthful mechanisms that can provide good
approximations to maximum matchings with desirable properties. Note that the lower
bound on the performance of deterministic truthful mechanisms that produce Pareto op-
timal matchigns extends to those producing matchings that satisfy these stronger opti-
mality criteria. It will thus be the focus of future work to consider the performance of
randomised truthful mechanisms for these problems.
As far as lower bounds for randomised Pareto optimal mechanisms are concerned,
we proved a lower bound of 1813 for any universally truthful Pareto optimal mechanism.
Moreover, we obtained a tight lower bound for the class of symmetrizations of truthful,
Pareto optimal and non-bossy mechanisms using a characterization due to Bade [7]. We
believe that the existence of a lower bound of ee−1 for any universally truthful Pareto
optimal mechanism is an interesting open question, and our lower bound of 1813 is a useful
step towards resolving this.
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Appendix
In this section we prove Theorem 3.7 and also provide a systematic way of enumerating
all Pareto optimal matchings. The following result is an important first step towards the
former goal.
Theorem 3.8. Any Pareto optimal matching is a strong priority matching for some or-
dering σ of the agents.
Proof. This proof makes use of the characterisation of Pareto optimal matchings in in-
stances of HA (potentially with ties) given by Proposition 2.1. Let a Pareto optimal
matching µ be given.
Let G = (V,E) be the envy graph for µ, defined as follows. In the graph, V = N and
there is a directed edge from agent i to agent k if and only if i weakly prefers µ(k) to µ(i).
Every edge is colored. An edge (i, k) is colored green if µ(k) 'i µ(i), and is colored red
otherwise—i.e., if µ(k) i µ(i). We claim that all the edges in every strongly connected
component (SCC) of G are green (we denote this claim by C1). To see this, note that
by the definition of strongly connected components, there is a path from every node in
a given component to every other node in the component. Hence, if there is a red edge
(i, k) in a SCC, then there must be a cycle with a red edge in the SCC (as there must be
a path from k to i). A cycle with at least one red edge corresponds to a cyclic coalition
and hence µ could have not been a Pareto optimal matching, a contradiction.
Create graph G′ = (V ′, E′) as follows. There is a vertex in V ′ for each SCC of G, and
there is a directed edge in G′ from vr to vs, vr, vs ∈ V ′ and vr 6= vs, if and only if there is
an edge in G from i to k for some i and k that belong to the SCCs of vr and vs. It follows
from the definition of strongly connected components that G′ is a DAG. Hence G′ admits
a topological ordering. Let X be a reversed topological ordering of G′. Let σ = i1, . . . , in1
be an ordering of all the agents that is consistent with X. That is, for every two agents
ij and ir, 1 ≤ j < r ≤ n1, the corresponding SCC of ij appears in X no later than the
corresponding SCC of ir. (The order of the agents belonging to the same SCC can be
determined arbitrarily.) We prove that µ is an SPM w.r.t. σ.
Assume, for a contradiction, that our claim does not hold. That is, µ is not an SPM
w.r.t. σ. Hence there must exist another matching µ′ which has a lexicographically smaller
signature than µ; i.e., ρ(µ′) < ρ(µ) (we denote this fact by A1). Let ij be the highest
priority agent, w.r.t σ, such that ij strictly prefers his partner under µ
′ to his partner
under µ; i.e., µ′(ij) ij µ(ij) (we denote this assumption by A2). Note that µ′(ij) must
be matched in µ or else µ admits an alternating coalition, namely P = 〈ij , µ′(ij)〉—as
ij strictly prefers unmatched object µ
′(ij) to his partner µ(ij)—and hence not Pareto
optimal. So µ′(ij) is matched under µ to, say, ik. Following A2, there must be a red
edge from ij to ik in the envy graph G. Therefore, ik must have a higher priority than
ij according to σ (note that, by C1, ij and ik cannot belong to the same SCC). It then
follows from A1 and A2 that ik is matched under µ
′ and ranks his partners under µ and
µ′ the same; i.e. µ(ik) 'ik µ′(ik). Now, µ′(ik) must be matched in µ or else there is
an alternating path coalition in µ, namely P = 〈ij , ik, µ′(ik)〉, and hence µ is not Pareto
optimal. Also, ik cannot be matched to µ(ij) or else there is a cyclic coalition in µ,
namely P = 〈ij , ik〉, and hence µ is not Pareto optimal. So µ′(ik) is matched under µ to,
say, ir, ir 6= ij . Also, there is a green edge from ik to ir in G, since µ′(ik) = µ(ir) and
µ(ik) 'ik µ′(ik) . We claim that ir must have a higher priority than ij (we denote this
claim by C2). To see this, first of all note that there cannot exist a path between ir and
ij in G or else G admits a cycle with at least one red edge, namely (ij , ik), and hence µ
admits a cyclic coalition and is not Pareto optimal. Now, to complete the proof of C2,
we consider two cases regarding whether there is a path from ir to ik or not.
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• Case 1: There is a path from ir to ik in G. Since there is an path from ik to ir, then
ir and ik must belong to the same strongly connected component. Therefore since
ik has a higher priority than ij under σ, so must ir.
• Case 2: There is no path from ir to ik in G. Therefore ir and ik belong to two
different SCCs. Since there is an path from ik to ir in G, there is an edge in G
′ from
the SCC corresponding to ik to the SCC corresponding to ir. Therefore ir must have
a higher priority than ik under X and thus under σ as well. Hence, by transitivity,
ir has a higher priority than ij under σ.
So far we have established that ir has a higher priority than ij . Now, using a similar
argument as for ik, we can show that ir must be matched under µ
′ and must rank his
partners under µ and µ′ the same. Also, again using a similar argument as for ik, µ′(ir) is
not the same object as µ(ij) and µ
′(ir) must be matched in µ or else there is an alternating
path coalition in µ contradicting the Pareto optimality of µ. So µ′(ir) is matched under
µ, to say iq. Using exactly the same argument as we used for ir we can show that iq also
has a higher priority than ij . We can keep repeating this argument and every time we
have to reach a new agent with a higher priority than ij . However, there are a bounded
number of agents and hence a bounded number of agents with higher priority than ij , a
contradiction.
Using Theorem 3.8, we show that SDMT-1 is capable of producing any given Pareto
optimal matching.
Theorem 3.7. Any Pareto optimal matching can be generated by some execution of
SDMT-1.
Proof. Let µ be a Pareto optimal matching for an instance I of HA. By Theorem 3.8, µ is
an SPM for some ordering σ of the agents. Execute SDMT-1 given σ as follows. At each
phase i, choose (i, µ(i)) as the augmenting path. Notice that since µ is a matching, both i
and µ(i) must be unmatched at the beginning of phase i. Futhermore, since µ is an SPM
w.r.t σ, there cannot be an augmenting path from i to an object that i strictly prefers to
µ(i).
The above theorem implies that any Pareto optimal matching has a nonzero chance
of materialising if we execute the following procedure: (1) randomly generate a priority
ordering over the agents σ, (2) run SDMT-1 given σ, and (3) whenever faced with more
than one choice, pick an augmenting path at random. Enumerating all Pareto optimal
matchings in a more systematic way is however possible with the aid of Theorem 3.8 and
the two forthcoming propositions, Proposition 3.9 and Proposition 3.10.
Following Theorem 3.8, enumerating all Pareto optimal matchings is equivalent to
enumerating all matchings µ such that µ is a strong priority matching w.r.t. some ordering
of the agents. Recall that all SPMs w.r.t. σ have the same signature. It hence follows
that:
Proposition 3.9. Let µ∗ be a matching returned by SDMT-1 for a given priority ordering
of the agents σ = i1, . . . , in1. Then, a given matching µ is a strong priority matching w.r.t.
σ if and only if
• the same set of agents are matched under both µ and µ∗, and
• each matched agent i is matched under µ to an object that he ranks the same as
µ∗(i); i.e., rank(i, µ(i)) = rank(i, µ∗(i)).
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Let G(σ) = (V,E) be a graph where V = N∗ ∪ O where N∗ is the set of agents that
are matched under µ∗. There is an edge between an agent i ∈ N∗ and an object o ∈ O if
and only if i ranks o the same as µ∗(i). It is then easy to see that:
Proposition 3.10. A matching µ is a strong priority matching w.r.t. σ if and only if it
is a maximum cardinality matching in G(σ).
Theorem 3.11. Given and instance I of HA, all Pareto optimal matchigns of I can be
enumerated in time O(n1!).
Proof. It follows Theorem 3.8 that to enumerate all Pareto optimal matchings it is enough
to execute the following procedure on all possible σ: (1) run SDMT-1 given σ, and (2)
enumerate all SPMs w.r.t. σ. It follows Proposition 3.10 that to enumerate all SPMs w.r.t.
σ we need only to enumerate all maximum cardinality matchings w.r.t. G(σ). The latter
can be achieved in O(|V |) time per matching [36].
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